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The Relevance Games:
Congress's Choices for Economic
Substance Gamemakers
CHARLENE D. LUKE*
ABSTRACT
Codification of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 ushered in a new
phase in the debate regarding the meaning and reach of the doctrine. The
main statutory hint as to the intended scope of the codified economic sub-
stance doctrine is ambiguous, providing, "The determination of whether the
economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in
the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted." This Article
argues that this language should be read in light of the codification history,
which stretches back for over ten years before enactment. This history sug-
gests that the relevance provision is primarily about maintaining the precodi-
fication balance of decision making between tax agencies and courts. The
history also indicates that the provision reflects congressional concurrence
in the precodification trajectory of the doctrine, particularly in terms of the
types of transactions that were being litigated.
The movement from the common law to codified statute brought with it
the potential application of a complex web of authority regarding interac-
tions between tax agencies and courts in their administration, enforcement,
and interpretation of the Code. Included in that web is the general ability of
the tax agencies to obtain strong deference from the courts as to the agencies'
authoritative, reasonable interpretations of textual ambiguities. The economic
substance legislative history acknowledges the general interpretive authority
of the tax agencies but does not suggest a specific path for reconciling that
authority with the requirement that development of the doctrine continue
"in the same manner" as under the common law. This Article proposes that
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the various strands in the legislative history can be reconciled by interpreting
the relevance provision as adding two directions to tax agencies and courts:
(1) the statute does not apply to transactions that are clearly consistent with
the form and purpose of claimed tax benefits and (2) the courts have final
discretion over whether a specific, litigated transaction ultimately fails the
requirements of the economic substance doctrine.
I. Introduction
Before the Supreme Court's landmark decision naming the health care
mandate a tax,' codification of the economic substance doctrine was among
the most controversial tax items contained in the health care legislation. 2 In
broad terms, the economic substance doctrine functions to detect abusive tax
shelters and to deny all tax benefits claimed through such shelters. Courts
originally developed the economic substance doctrine, with early Supreme
Court opinions laying the groundwork and lower courts ultimately structur-
'Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593-600 (2012) (holding individual
mandate was a constitutional exercise of taxing power). Prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion on the mandate, numerous articles appeared regarding both the Commerce Clause and
tax aspects of the case. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010) (responsibility payment is a constitu-
tional income tax); Edward Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, TAX NOTES (TA) 755, 761-62
(Aug. 16, 2010) (healthcare penalty is a constitutional income tax tied to self-insurance); Ste-
ven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES
(TA) 169 (July 12, 2010) (arguing that penalty is an unconstitutional, unapportioned direct
tax-assuming it is a tax).
2The health care legislation also included other (labeled) taxes, including an increase in the
penalty tax on nonqualifying distributions from certain medical savings accounts, I.R.C. %§
220(f)(4)(A), 223(f)(4)(A); a 0.9% increase to the Medicare tax on earned income for certain
individuals, I.R.C. § 3101(b); a new 3.8% Medicare tax on unearned income for certain indi-
viduals, I.R.C. § 1411; a 10% excise tax on indoor tanning services, I.R.C. § 5000B; a 2.3%
excise tax on the sale of medical devices, I.R.C. 5 4191; and a 40% excise tax on high-cost
employer-sponsored health coverage, I.R.C. § 49801. The Medicare taxes and medical device
tax are not scheduled to take effect until 2013, and the 40% "Cadillac plan" tax takes effect
in 2018. For a concise summary of the tax provisions of the healthcare legislation, see CCH
EDITouAL STAFF, 2010 TAx LEGISLATION (2010).
The commentary on the economic substance doctrine is extensive. See, e.g., Joseph Bank-
man, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Karen C. Burke, Refram-
ing Economic Substance, 31 VA. TAx REV. 271 (2011); David P Hariton, The Frame Game:
How Defining the 'Transaction' Decides the Case, 63 TAx LAw. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Hariton,
Frame Game]; David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAw.
235 (1999); Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IowA L. REv. 389, 395-98
(2010); Charlene Luke, What Would Hemy Simons Do?: Usingan Ideal to Shape and Evplain the
Economic Substance Doctrine, 11 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 108 (2011) [hereinafter Luke, Using
an IdealJ; Charlene Luke, Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance, 27 VA. TAX REV. 783
(2008) [hereinafter Luke, Risk, Return]; Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Living with the CodifiedEco-
nomic Substance Doctrine, 128 TAX NOTES (TA) 731 (Aug. 16, 2010) [hereinafter, McMahon,
Jr., Living with Codifedl; Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Economic Substance, Purposive Activity, and
Corporate Tax Shelters, 94 TAX NOTES (TA) 1017 (Feb. 25, 2002).
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ing the more formal elements of the doctrine.3 For over ten years prior to the
healthcare legislation, Congress considered various proposals for codification
of the economic substance doctrine, generating in the process a wealth of
background material-material that is all the more important because of the
context in which the doctrine was enacted.' Instead of being the centerpiece
of anti-tax-avoidance legislation, as had been the case in several earlier bills,
the economic substance doctrine was codified as a small piece of one of the
most expansive, and contentious, legislative packages in recent memory.' Had
Justice Scalia's dissenting position commanded a majority, the economic sub-
stance statute would have been among the "minor provisions" struck down as
not severable from the main health care legislation.6
The uncertainty of the economic substance doctrine's scope contributed
significantly to the controversy surrounding Congress's codification efforts.
The fear was that tax agencies' would ruthlessly drag innocent transactions
into the economic substance doctrine arena. Codification raised the spec-
ter that tax agencies would also be able to rig the game by issuing inter-
pretive regulations, making the eventual demise of the selected transactions
virtually certain. Such fears seem somewhat disingenuous given the types
of transactions that had been tested in the courts under the common law
economic substance doctrine.) On the other hand, the statutory text, on its
face, does little to address concerns about when a transaction will be tested
under the doctrine or when such a test is likely to lead to the rejection of a
particular transaction.'
The main textual hint as to the scope of the codified doctrine provides the
determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a
3See infra Part II; see also McMahon, Jr., Living with Codifed, supra note 2, at 734-36.
4See infra Part III.
'The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029. The economic substance doctrine was contained in the Health Care and Edu-
cation Reconciliation Act of 2010. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Star. 1029; see also infra Part III.
6Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'The term "tax agencies" is used as a shorthand term for the complex group of adminis-
trative agencies tasked with oversight and enforcement of the Code. The Service is a bureau
within the Department of Treasury (Treasury). Treasury also contains several other tax-related
advisers and offices. See DAvID M. RICHARDSON ET AL., CIVIL TAx PROCEDURE 5 (2d ed. 2008).
The Service handles the majority of the "day-to-day administration of the tax laws," including
audits and Tax Court litigation. Id. at 6. Treasury and the Service generally jointly prepare
formal guidance, including regulations. The Service generally issues less formal guidance (e.g.,
Revenue Rulings, private letter rulings), but even as to such material, collaboration with Trea-
sury is frequent. Id. at 17-25. Tax litigation in all federal courts other than the Tax Court is
generally conducted by the Department of Justice, usually in consultation with the Treasury
and the Service. Id. at 12.
'See Luke, Using an Ideal, supra note 2, at 151-70; Luke, Risk, Return, supra note 2, at
816-31.
'See I.R.C. § 7701(o).
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transaction shall be made in the same manner as if this subsection had never
been enacted.'o If taken literally, this language seems to require an impossible
task-that the decision about whether to subject a transaction to the new
statute be made by asking what would have happened if the statute had never
been enacted, even though lack of uniformity in the courts was an important
rationale for codification." This Article argues that this language should be
read in light of the extended codification history,12 which suggests that the
relevance provision 3 is primarily about maintaining the precodification bal-
ance of decision making between tax agencies and courts. The history also
indicates that the provision reflects congressional concurrence in the precodi-
fication trajectory of the doctrine, particularly in terms of the types of trans-
actions that were being litigated."
The movement from the common law to codified statute brought with it
the potential application of a complex web of authority regarding interac-
tions between tax agencies and courts in their administration, enforcement,
and interpretation of the Code. Included in this web is the general ability of
the tax agencies to obtain strong deference from the courts as to the agen-
'ol.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
"See infra Part III.C.1.
12Various other authors have addressed portions of the legislative history, particularly the
technical report written by the Joint Committee on Taxation. See, e.g., Tracy A. Kaye, The
Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in The United States, 58 Am. J. Comp. LAw. 585, 600-04
(2010); McMahon Jr., Living with Codified, supra note 2; Bret Wells, Economic Substance Doc-
trine: How Codification Changes Decided Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REv. 411 (2010). This Article
draws from a broader array of material than other economic substance legislative history dis-
cussions have done.
Although this Article draws on a wealth of congressional materials regarding the economic
substance doctrine, the materials analyzed in this Article are a fraction of the materials regard-
ing tax shelters more generally. Academic, practitioner, and journalistic commentary on the
various legislative proposals for the economic substance doctrine undoubtedly also played an
important role in shaping the codified version. And, of course, cases involving the economic
substance doctrine as well as related doctrines were being litigated and decided over the course
of Congress's long deliberation over the doctrine. Because of space constraints, this Article does
not provide consideration of the broader historical context and its potential influence over con-
gressional deliberation, though in some instances court decisions are discussed because they are
raised directly in the congressional materials on the economic substance doctrine.
1
3 he term "relevance provision" will be used throughout even though the precise term
used in the statute is "relevant"-using "relevant provision" or similar as the descriptor would
cause unnecessary confusion. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing dictionary
definitions of "relevant").
"4See McMahon Jr., Living with Codifed, supra note 2, at 737; Wells, supra note 12, at
417-18.
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cies' authoritative, reasonable interpretations of textual ambiguities." The
economic substance legislative history acknowledges the general interpretive
authority of the tax agencies but does not suggest a specific path for recon-
ciling that authority with the preference that development of the doctrine
continue "in the same manner" as under the common law.16 This Article pro-
poses that the various strands in the legislative history can be reconciled by
interpreting the relevance provision as adding two directions to tax agencies
and courts: (1) the statute does not apply to transactions that are clearly con-
sistent with the form and purpose of claimed tax benefits, and (2) the courts
have final power to decide whether a specific, litigated transaction ultimately
fails the requirements of the economic substance doctrine.' 7
Under this reading of the relevance provision, tax agencies would use their
usual broad audit and litigation discretion in determining which transactions
would be subjected to the rigors of the economic substance doctrine arena."s
5 1.R.C. § 7805(a). Multiple articles over many years address the tax agencies' interpre-
tive authority and judicial deference. See, e.g., John E Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain:
Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 39,
72-92 (2003); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Stan-
dards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1995); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Refecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1537 (2006); Leandra Lederman, The
Fight Over 'Fighting Regs'and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REv. 643 (2012);
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force ofLaw: The Original
Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 570-75 (2002); see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ.
& Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-14 (2011) (holding that regulations issued
under section 7805(a) are analyzed under the Chevron line of cases).
For general discussion of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), and its progeny, see, for example, Stephen Breyer, judicial Review of Questions ofLaw
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 372-82 (1986); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88
B.U. L. REv. 1271 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 273 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187 (2006).
'
6 1.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). Theories regarding and discussion of the common law are also
abundant. See, e.g., Ernest J. Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L.
REv. 235 (1961); Frank B. Cross, Identifying the Virtues ofthe Common Law, 15 S. CT. EcoN.
REv. 21 (2007); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in jurisprudence, 85 CoLum. L.
REv. 38 (1985); Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication:A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REv. 287 (2003); George L.
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection ofEfficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977);
Paul Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Jay Tidmarsh &
Brian J. Murray, A Theory ofFederal Common Law, 100 Nw. U.L. REv. 585 (2006); Todd J.
Zywicki, The Rise and fall of Efficiency in The Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1551 (2003).
"See infa Part III. The second proposed direction implicates the complicated (and confus-
ing) line of cases on judicial deference. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Chevron deference in
context of proposed interpretation of relevance provision).
"For an overview of the tax agencies' audit and litigation functions, see BoRIs 1. BITTKER
ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 55 46.01-47.03, is 51.01-.11 (3d ed.
2002); RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 93-286.
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Tax agencies also would have authority to issue court-binding regulations
interpreting the requirements of the doctrine, but they would be constrained
in their ability to issue court-binding regulations that directly provided in
advance of litigation that a specific transaction failed the doctrine. This nar-
row constraint would ensure that courts would retain discretion as to the final
thumbs-up, thumbs-down decision on the economic substance doctrine's
ultimate relevance to a specific transaction. The scope of the economic sub-
stance doctrine standard would continue to emerge gradually and with flex-
ibility through the issuance of agency guidance and, most critically, through
the testing of multiple specific transactions on audit and in the courts. This
reading emphasizes that Congress has declined to answer the question, "when
is the economic substance doctrine relevant?"" in favor of providing guidance
as to the question of, "who will determine whether the economic substance
doctrine is relevant?"
Legislative history is, of course, only one tool of interpretation, and a highly
controversial one at that.20 Even if one embraces more dynamic approaches
to statutory interpretation, legislative history is still to be approached with
caution; material relating to unenacted bills, such as the material used in
this Article, falls under yet greater clouds of uncertainty.21 This Article thus
briefly considers at various points the relevance provision in light of a textu-
19Monte A. Jackel, When Is the Economic Substance Doctrine Relevant?, 2011 TAx NOTES
TODAY 128-8 (July 4, 2011).
2 0 See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
24-84 (2009); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 207-38
(1994); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
303-22 (2006); JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD Is LEGISLATIVE HISTORY?: JUSTICE SCALIA
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (2007); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 171-200 (1999); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The
Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law
and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative
History Tell Us?, 66 CH.-KENT L. REv. 441, 445 (1990); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Con-
stitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991);
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits offudicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833 (1998).
21See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 20, at 222; ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 307.
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alist approach to statutory interpretation that eschews legislative history.22
Textualists, who generally bear little love for the economic substance doctrine
in the first place,2 3 may be inclined to read the codified doctrine as being rel-
evant to a somewhat smaller group of transactions than would a judge willing
to draw on the doctrine's broader enactment history.24
The activities of Treasury and the Service to date as to the codified eco-
nomic substance doctrine suggest they are pursuing a strategy of asserting
broad discretion as to how to deploy economic substance on audit and in
litigation but resisting the issuance of any type of general guidance addressed
to the public." The Article considers, however, the possibility of a change
in the strategy of the tax agencies and posits three hypothetical regulations,
including hypothetical regulations creating specific lists of transactions that
pass or fail the economic substance doctrine. In the immediate aftermath of
the codification of the economic substance doctrine, discussion of "angel"
lists was common.26 This Article argues that particularized lists-whether
"demon" or "angel" list regulations-should not be entitled to strong defer-
ence from the courts on the grounds that such lists either would exceed the
authority implicitly delegated through the relevance provision's ambiguity or
would not be reasonably consistent with the statutory text and structure.27
22For general discussion of statutory interpretation in the context of tax law, see Ellen Aprill,
Theories of Statutory Interpretation: The Interpretive Voice, 38 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 2081 (2005);
Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1
(2004); Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Between
Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAx REv. 879 (2007); Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter
Regulation, 26 VA. TAx REV. 357 (2006); Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The
Role ofPurpose, 2 FLA. TAx REv. 492 (1995); Alan Gunn, Some Observations on the Interpreta-
tion Ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 63 TAXEs 28 (1985); Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax
Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 771 (1997); Michael Livingston, Congress,
the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L.
REv. 819 (1991); Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-form
Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 699 (2003); Shannon Weeks McCormack,
Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. Ill. L.
REV. 697 (2009); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code, 64 N.C.L. REV. 623 (1986).
2
3See Coltec Indus. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004), vacated by 454 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cit. 2006) (suggesting common law economic substance doctrine violated separation of
powers).
24A full discussion of textualism is beyond the scope of this Article. As a result, this Article
utilizes something of a caricature when speculating as to the likely decisions of a textualist. See
infra Part III.B.5. The authorities listed supra note 20, regarding legislative history, also gener-
ally discuss textualism. See also Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347 (2005);
John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Jona-
than R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 117 (2009).
25See infra Part IVA.
2 6See McMahon Jr., Living with Codified, supra note 2; Wilkins Defends Economic Substance
Doctrine, Schedule UTP, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 209-3 (Oct. 31, 2011) (the Service's Chief
Counsel reiterates that "Treasury or the IRS would not be putting out an angel list").
27See infra Part IV.B (discussing Chevron line of cases).
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This argument depends, of course, on the persuasiveness of the assertion that
the relevance provision indicates the congressional assignment of decision-
making authority between courts and tax agencies.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: Part II provides a brief
overview of the economic substance doctrine; Part III presents the proposed
reading of the relevance provision; Part IV reviews the tax agencies' postcodi-
fication actions on economic substance and poses hypothetical regulations
through which the tax agencies could move more aggressively to interpret the
relevance provision's ambiguities; and Part V is a short conclusion.
II. Economic Substance Doctrine Overview
Courts have a long history in tax controversies of looking beyond the form
employed by a taxpayer to the substance of a transaction.28 For example,
under a general substance-over-form analysis, a court might decide that the
technical owner of depreciable property does not own the property as a mat-
ter of substance; instead, some other person, the true tax owner, may claim
the tax deductions. The economic substance doctrine is related to this sub-
stance-over-form tradition, but the doctrine looks more to a taxpayer's formal
use of the tax law than to whether the underlying facts are as the taxpayer
has claimed.2 9 If a court uses the economic substance doctrine to reject a tax-
payer's formal version of the tax law's operation, the taxpayer's entire transac-
tion is treated as a substantive sham and all tax benefits are generally denied. 0
Thus, failure of the doctrine has a "no substance" effect; courts do not attempt
to apply an alternate substantive law to the factual transaction undertaken by
the taxpayer.3' Such a course is eminently pragmatic because the underlying
facts of transactions without economic substance will make very little or no
economic sense in the absence of the tax rules used by the taxpayers. 32
This relationship between the facts of the abusive transaction and the tax-
payers' use of tax law follows from the two inquiries of the economic substance
doctrine test. The first inquiry is objective and asks whether "the transaction
changes in a meaningful way (apart from federal income tax effects) the tax-
payer's economic position."33 In other words, the inquiry looks at whether
the facts of the transaction still make objective economic sense even when
2
8See Luke, Risk, Return, supra note 2, at 787-90.
291d. at 790.
30See Luke, Using an Ideal, supra note 2, at 116-17; Luke, Risk, Return, supra note 2, at
792. But see Economic Substance Doctrine May Apply to Securities Lending Scheme, 2012 TAX
NOTEs TODAY 234-18 (Dec. 5, 2012) (Associate Chief Counsel memorandum stating, "When
a transaction lacks economic substance, the Commissioner may disregard the parties' charac-
terization of the transaction and treat the transaction according to its substance" (citing Rices
Toyota World, 752 F.2d 89, 95 (4th Cir.))).
31 See Luke, Using an Ideal, supra note 2, at 117.
32 1n a prior article, I undertook an exploration of what a substitute law tied to the Haig-
Simons income definition might look like. Id. That article argued that the economic substance
doctrine operates within the Haig-Simons norm.
"I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).
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the claimed tax benefits are taken out of the equation. The second inquiry
takes into account taxpayer motive, asking whether "the taxpayer has a sub-
stantial purpose (apart from federal income tax effects) for entering into such
transaction."34 Prior to codification, there was lack of uniformity in the courts
regarding the phrasing and weight of these inquiries.35 Codification set the
phrasing as quoted above and specified that failure of either statutory inquiry
would cause the transaction to be disregarded.36
As the economic substance doctrine developed and gained court accep-
tance, the tax agencies' use of the doctrine also developed and evolved. By
the time of codification, the economic substance doctrine had become an
entrenched part of the tax agencies' audit and litigation arsenal.17 The tax
agencies did not issue economic substance doctrine regulations, and refer-
ence to the economic substance doctrine is relatively sparse even in the most
informal of pronouncements and rulings issued by the tax agencies." Tax
agencies did, however, promulgate regulations that included broad anti-abuse
language." Further, various disclosure requirements apply to transactions
listed by the tax agencies as tax-avoidance transactions, and multiple such
3 4I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). Codification provided some boundaries for how profit potential
could be used and set expectations regarding the treatment of foreign taxes. See infra notes
124-32 and accompanying text. The Code section also clarified that the doctrine is not appli-
cable to personal transactions. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(B).
35See Luke, Using an Ideal, supra note 2, at 115-18.
36See id. at 121.
37See discussion supra note 18.
38A handful of private letter rulings make mention of the doctrine in a substantive way. See
P.L.R. 2008-07-015 (Nov. 7, 2007) (stating, in the alternative, that a "transaction generat-
ing the foreign tax credits lacked economic substance"); P.L.R. 1999-34-002 (May 24, 1999)
(stating that the doctrine applies to a "compensation-related transaction"); PL.R. 1999-10-046
(Nov. 16, 1998) (discussing application of doctrine to interest deduction); P.L.R. 1999-01-005
(Sept. 29, 1998) (discussing application of doctrine to interest deduction); P.L.R. 1998-12-
005 (Mar. 20, 1998) (treatment of corporate-owned life insurance contracts); see also C.C.A.
2009-15-033 (Dec. 24, 2008); C.A.M. 2008-40-040 (June 12, 2008); C.A.M. 2008-49-012
(June 4, 2008); C.A.M. 2008-26-036 (Feb. 29, 2008); ES.A. 2002-02-057 (Oct. 11, 2001);
ES.A. 2001-43-004 Uuly 5, 2001); ES.A. 2000-49-003 (Sept. 1, 2000).
39 Reg. § 1.701-2 (general anti-abuse rules applicable to partnerships); Reg. § 1.704-3(a)
(10) (anti-abuse rule relating to disparities between value and basis at time of contribution to
partnership). For discussion of partnership-related anti-abuse regulations, see Karen C. Burke,
Castle Harbour: Economic Substance and the Overall- Tax-Efect Test, 107 TAX NOTES (TA) 1163
(May 30, 2005); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Illusory Partnership Interests
and the Anti-Abuse Rule, 132 TAX NOTES (TA) 813 (Aug. 22, 2011); Alan Gunn, The Use and
Misuse ofAntiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REv.
159 (2001).
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transactions have been identified.40 Still, precodification, the tax agencies'
primary means of influencing the economic substance doctrine was through
their audit and litigation functions."
Codification may have put an end to arguments that the economic sub-
stance doctrine was invalid because of a lack of statutory authority, but such
quasi-tax-protester arguments comprised only a small part of the criticisms
leveled at the doctrine.42 In particular, the statute does not directly address
various "when" questions of economic substance: When will taxpayer action
rise to the level of a "transaction?" When will such a transaction be scruti-
nized under the doctrine? When will the doctrine be applied in preference to
other tax authorities? When will a transaction be likely to fail the inquiries of
the doctrine?43 Critics of the doctrine might argue that the two inquiries of
the economic substance doctrine are analogous to, and as useful as, the twin
prongs of a divining rod. Such an assertion would be extreme, particularly
given the history of actual transactions subjected to the doctrine." But it is
fair to say that the common law economic substance doctrine carried with it
an unofficial step that was more of a smell test than a formalized inquiry.
The boundaries of this unofficial economic substance inquiry were neces-
sarily amorphous because abusive tax avoidance schemes may be built from
smaller bits of law and facts that are inert when kept apart but catch fire when
combined. Indeed, the necessity of an economic substance standard lies in
the practical impossibility of stating in advance all possible abusive permuta-
tions given the size and complexity of the tax system. Sometimes a smell test
40 See I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6112, 6662A, 6707, 6707A, 6708; Notice 2009-59, 2009-2 C.B.
170 (listed transactions update). The Service's website maintains a list of the current "listed"
transactions. Listed Transactions - LBe'rI Tier I Issues, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Cor-
porations/Listed-Transactions---LB&I-Tier--Issues (last visited Feb. 17, 2013); see also Trans-
actions of Interest-Not LMSB Tier I Issues, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/
Transactions-of-Interest---Not-LMSB-Tier-I-Issues (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (transactions
of interest).
For an overview of the "reportable transactions" regime and other tax shelter disclosure
mechanisms, see Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. REv. 1629 (2009); Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARY. J.
ON LEGIs. 111 (2009); Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation
Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORD. L. REV. 961 (2006).
"
1See supra note 18.
42See Luke, Using an Ideal, supra note 2, at 126.
43See Jackel, supra note 19. The same questions were also raised regarding the common law.
See, e.g., David Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?,
60 TAx L. REv. 29 (2006).
"See generally supra note 2 (referencing various articles regarding the economic substance
doctrine).
45See Luke, Using an Ideal, supra note 2, at 171; see also Lederman, supra note 2, at 441 (the
prongs of economic substance do "little to distinguish abuse cases from legitimate activity").
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is the best available choice, even if there is a natural hesitation to state baldly
that tax consequences hinge on a judgment call.16
The desire of taxpayers for immediate certainty and clear answers to ques-
tions about the doctrine's scope is even more understandable given the conse-
quence of failing the doctrine.17 Codification left in place the "no substance"
outcome for transactions failing the economic substance test." In addition to
maintaining the doctrine's all-or-nothing approach to tax benefits, Congress
raised the stakes by imposing a strict liability penalty of 20% (40% for undis-
closed transactions) on any tax understatement resulting from failure to pass
muster under the economic substance doctrine.4 These penalties also, how-
ever, alter the pragmatic and political considerations the tax agencies must
weigh in determining how to enforce the doctrine. Rather than inspiring
the agencies to use the doctrine aggressively, the strict liability penalty may,
in the interest of avoiding political repercussions, cause the agencies to act
with greater caution so that only obviously abusive transactions-and taxpay-
ers-get hit with it.5 0 As will be discussed in Part IV, the tax agencies have
been acting with greater caution than is statutorily required, but their current
course also seems less likely to draw unwelcome scrutiny."
III. Reading Relevance
This Part begins with background information regarding some underlying
assumptions governing the proposed reading as well as an overview of the
available sources of legislative history. The Part then turns to the interpreta-
tion of the relevance provision already mentioned in the Introduction: (1)
the statute does not apply to transactions that are clearly consistent with the
form and purpose of claimed tax benefits, and (2) the courts have final power
to decide whether a specific, litigated transaction ultimately fails the require-
ments of the economic substance doctrine.
46 See Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REv. 131, 142
(2001) ("Logic will take us only so far. Some decisions are not reducible to principles that can
be stated authoritatively or that can be applied axiomatically.").
47See Neil Barr et al., Practitioners Want More Specifics on Codified Economic Substance Doc-
trine, 2011 TAx NOTES TODAY 86-19 (May 4, 2011).
For a general discussion of the possible benefits and detriments of using tax law uncertainty,
see Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REv. 489 (2011).
"I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(a).
49 The strict liability penalty follows from the combination of multiple Code provisions:
I.R.C. %§ 6662(b)(6), 6664(c)(2), (d)(2); see also I.R.C. § 6676 (20% penalty on excessive
amount refund claim not eligible for "reasonable basis" defense if excess attributable to failing
economic substance doctrine).
"oSee Charlene Luke, Three Once and Future Issues, 30 ABA SECTION OF TAXATION NEWS
QUARTERLY 1, 20 (2010).
" See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
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A. Background Notes
1. Governing Assumptions
This Article relies on a pragmatic, dynamic approach to statutory inter-
pretation, with the goal of using legislative history to find an interpretation
that will make sense of the textual language while ensuring a robust, flexible
economic substance doctrine in the future.52 Clearly, multiple underlying
assumptions are at work in the preceding statement, the defense of which is
not possible given space constraints.53 The background section on economic
substance will have to stand in for a fuller account of the importance of an
anti-tax-avoidance standard." This Part contains suggestions throughout as
to how a more textualist approach to the relevance provision might play out,
but the Article does not engage in an analytical discussion of the various theo-
ries of statutory interpretation.
Even among those judges and scholars who accept the use of legislative his-
tory, there is extensive debate about how it should be used and which types
are most acceptable." Again, this Article sidesteps an analysis of that under-
lying debate and organizes its use of legislative history within each point by
adapting the ranking from most authoritative to least authoritative suggested
by Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett. 7 Under this ranking, committee
reports relating to enacted language will be "the most authoritative evidence,"
followed by sponsor statements, colloquy or hearings, rejected proposals, and
statements by others." Although the bulk of the legislative history on eco-
nomic substance stems from unenacted bills, even early bills contain sub-
stantial portions of text that are identical to the final enacted version. The
discussion of rejected language-language contained in earlier bills that does
not appear in the final statute-uses a similar hierarchy of authoritativeness. 9
2. Sources ofEconomic Substance Legislative History
This Part draws on committee reports and individual statements only if
related directly to a "bill" containing economic substance language. The
author's searches did turn up economic substance language in committee
reports and in the congressional record that was not associated with a bill
containing the doctrine. But a preliminary review of such material indicated
it was repetitious of the language or discussion available through a consider-
52See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 20, at 102-33; ESKIDGE, J., supra note 20, at 50-52.
"See supra note 20 (listing authorities on use of legislative history).
4See discussion supra Part II.
"See supra note 24; discussion infra Part III.B.5.
6See supra note 20 (listing authorities regarding legislative history).
"ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 222.
1Id. at 317.
"See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR, supra note 20, at 222; ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 317.
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ation of only items formally labeled "bills" and their associated reports and
statements.60
The first bill to address and to codify elements of the economic substance
doctrine was expressly proposed in 1999;61 this was followed by numerous
successive bills, roughly 70 in all, reflecting multiple versions of the doctrine
and generating several committee reports and statements by sponsors and
others. 62 The relevance provision as eventually codified first appeared in a bill
proposed in October 2007,63 but the provision did not immediately appear
in all subsequent bills. Instead, it competed with other versions that, although
containing references to relevance, did not include the "in the same manner"
and "never been enacted" language of the enacted relevance provision."M
The economic substance doctrine finally was codified as a minor provision
of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Healthcare
Reconciliation Act).65 The Healthcare Reconciliation Act has only two docu-
ments associated with it; they are also the only two documents relating to
bills containing the relevance provision. The most important of these is the
"General Explanation" or "Blue Book" report issued by the Joint Committee
60All searches were conducted using the LexisNexis service. The database groups searched
for this project were: (1) Congressional Full Text of Bills for the 104th (coverage begins Jan.
1995) through 111th Congresses (each Congress has a separate database); (2) "Committee
Reports" (CMTRPT), which has partial coverage from 1990 and full coverage from 1994
forward of the full text of House and Senate Committee Reports; and (3) "Congressional
Record" (RECORD), which contains the full text of the congressional record from Jan. 3,
1985 forward.
The economic substance doctrine was often considered in conjunction with other anti-tax-
avoidance measures-for example, enhanced disclosure requirements, anti-tax-haven provi-
sions, and tax shelter promoter penalties. See, e.g., THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FiRMs IN THE
U.S. TAx SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 109-54 (2005) (prepared by S. Comm. on Home-
land Sec. and Governmental Affairs). Consideration of congressional materials on those topics
is beyond the scope of this Article.
6
'Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999) (as
introduced in the House, June 17, 1999).
62
"Roughly seventy," depending on how one counts bills; each numbered bill may include
multiple versions. See GAIL L. RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAx RESEARCH 104 (8th ed. 2010). The
Healthcare Reconciliation Act was the 71st bill to refer to the economic substance doctrine if
one counts by unique bill numbers having at least one or more versions containing codifica-
tion of economic substance doctrine elements. List of Economic Substance Bills (on file with
author).
63Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3501 (2007) (as
introduced in the House, Oct. 25, 2007).
64See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
6
'Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1047. This is the smaller of two acts that together comprised the total health care reform
package. The other, larger act was the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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on Taxation.66 The "General Explanation" for the health care bills was issued
in March 2011, one year after enactment."7 In March 2010, the Joint Com-
mittee also issued a "Technical Explanation" (JCT Technical Explanation).6 1
The passages on the economic substance doctrine in the two JCT documents
are not identical; this Article relies on the 2011 "General Explanation" ver-
sion (JCT Report), and the Article footnotes indicate places where the JCT
Report departs from the JCT Technical Explanation. The JCT Report is the
only document that relates to the finalized version of the economic substance
text.
The second document given priority is a 2009 report issued by the House
Committee on Ways and Means (2009 Ways and Means Report)6 9 that was
reprinted in the House Committee on the Budget's report for the Healthcare
Reconciliation Act.70 The 2009 Ways and Means report relates to a version
of the economic substance doctrine that, while including the relevance provi-
sion, differed at a few points from the codified version. In general, the dif-
ferences between the final JCT Report and the JCT Technical Explanation
moved the JCT Report closer to the 2009 Ways and Means Report. The lan-
guage of the economic substance doctrine as originally reported in the House
in connection with the Healthcare Reconciliation Act matched that of the
"See RICHMOND, supra note 62, at 113-14 (discussing general importance ofJCT reports);
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 20, at 1280-83 (describing JCT and the importance of its
expertise).
The Blue Book prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation is not technically legislative
history because it is not issued by Congress and it generally postdates the enacted legislation.
See Estate of Hutchinson v. Commissioner, 765 E2d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1985); Michael Liv-
ingston, What's Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a Committee Report: GeneralExplana-
tions and the Role of "Subsequent" Tax Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 91 (1994). The
Tax Court in Redlark v. Commissioner stated, "Where there is no corroboration in the actual
legislative history, we shall not hesitate to disregard the General Explanation as afar as con-
gressional intent is concerned." Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31, 45 (1996), revd, 141
E3d 936 (9th Cir. 1998). In its review of Redlark, the Ninth Circuit expanded, "While such
post-enactment explanations cannot properly be described as 'legislative history,' they are at
least instructive as to the reasonableness of an agency's interpretation of a facially ambiguous
statute." Redlark, 141 E3d at 941.
The Tax Court later reversed its position as to the particular interpretive question at issue in
Redlark and, in the process, also slightly modified its statement regarding materials prepared by
the Joint Committee on Taxation: "[If a Blue Book were to conflict with enacted language or
controlling legislative history, then the statutory language or the controlling legislative history
would prevail." Robinson v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44, 65 (2002).
'
7JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAx LEGISLATION ENACTED
IN THE 111TH CONGRESS, JCS-2-11 (2011), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=showdown&id=3777 [hereinafter JCT REP.]; see also JCX-20-1 1 (Mar. 23, 2011)
(errata relating to the JCT REP.).
'
5 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH
THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT" (2011), available at https://www.jct.
gov/publications.html?func=fileinfo&id=3673.
69H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2 (2009).
70H.R. REP. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 5 (2010).
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bill for which the 2009 Ways and Means Report was prepared.7 1 In keeping
with the hierarchy of authoritativeness discussed above, when using legisla-
tive history, this Part gives priority to the JCT Report followed by the 2009
Ways and Means Report. If these items are silent or incomplete, then less
authoritative sources are used to fill gaps and to provide additional support.
These sources include seven other committee reports-four from the Senate
Committee on Finance and three Conference Reports. 72
B. Clearly Consistent with Form and Purpose of Claimed Tax Benefits
The text of the codified doctrine contains neither carve-outs for particular
transactions nor general language regarding the interaction of the doctrine
with other tax rules.7 1 The JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report,
as well as multiple other reports and statements, all support the position that
even if a transaction technically fails one or more prongs of the economic
substance doctrine, the transaction may still be saved by the taxpayer show-
ing that the transaction is instead governed by a more specific provision or
program.7 ' Although this history may provide comfort to taxpayers genuinely
concerned about routine business and investment transactions, the history
is also almost entirely superfluous with respect to such activities because the
same principle is readily derived from commonly used canons of construc-
tion7 5 and from the application of the generally applicable burden of proof
rules that apply in tax cases.76 The discussion in the legislative history regard-
ing carve-outs should, however, give pause to promoters or other individuals
planning elaborate transactions to generate tax benefits. The history suggests
that courts should not take seriously taxpayer arguments that the fault is in
the complexity or uncertainty of tax rules rather than in taxpayer obfusca-
tions and arbitrage. The history also suggests that courts should use a purpo-
sive approach to judging whether a claimed tax provision governs instead of
the economic substance doctrine.7 7
Compare America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong.
§ 452 (2009), with H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 55-56 (2009).
72 S. REP. No. 110-206, at 88 (2007); S. REP. No. 109-336, at 137 (2006); H.R. REP. No.
109-455, at 220 (2006) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 650 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); S.
REP. No. 108-192, at 83 (2003); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 44 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP.
No. 108-11, at 76 (2003).
nSee Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 5 1409,
124 Stat. 1029, 1067-70.
74See JCT REP., supra note 67, at 379-80; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291 (2009);
Memorandum from Heather Maloy, Comm'r, Large Bus. & Int'l Div., IRS, to Indus. Dirs.,
IRS (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Guidance-for-Examiners-and-
Managers-on-the-Codified-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties.
"See discussion infa Part III.B.5.
76See infra note 135.
"See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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1. "Clearly Consistent" with Purpose and Text
The JCT Report provides as to the interaction of the economic substance
doctrine with other tax rules, "If the realization of the tax benefits of a trans-
action is consistent with the Congressional purpose or plan that the tax ben-
efits were designed by Congress to effectuate, it is not intended that such tax
benefits be disallowed."7 This statement appears in a footnote immediately
following the only discussion of the relevance provision contained in the JCT
Report.7 9 The 2009 Ways and Means Report uses an even stronger phrasing,
which also appears in a footnote relating to material discussing the relevance
provision: "If the tax benefits are clearly consistent with all applicable provi-
sions of the Code and the purposes of such provisions, it is not intended that
such tax benefits be disallowed . . . ."" Six earlier committee reports similarly
stated, "If the tax benefits are clearly contemplated and expected by the lan-
guage and purpose of the relevant authority, it is not intended that such tax
benefits be disallowed.""
All of these sources emphasize that any argument that a transaction is gov-
erned by a more specific tax benefit must take into account not only the
plain language of the claimed tax benefit, but also the purposes behind that
claimed benefit. The legislative history thus expressly contemplates a purpo-
sive approach to reading any other tax rules claimed by the taxpayer. All of the
sources other than the JCT Report use the word "clearly" as the adverb, indi-
cating the degree of certainty regarding the application of a claimed tax ben-
efit over the economic substance doctrine. The JCT Report does not explain
why it contains a different phrasing from all other prior reports, but both the
JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report make a point of quoting from
a Federal Circuit decision:8 2
The Federal Circuit Court stated that "when the taxpayer claims a deduc-
tion, it is the taxpayer who bears the burden of proving that the transaction
has economic substance." The Federal Circuit Court quoted a decision of its
predecessor court, stating that "Gregory v. Helvering requires that a taxpayer
carry an unusually heavy burden when he attempts to demonstrate that
"JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378 n.1034 .
79See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
80H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291 n.124 (2009). The 2009 Ways and Means Report
is identical to the enacted bill with respect to the relevance provision. See also S. REP. No. 110-
206, at 92 n.126 (2007).
'IS. REP. No. 109-336, at 138 n.277 (2006); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 223 n.365 (2006)
(Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 666 n.634 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No. 108-
192, at 86 n.121 (2003); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 46 n.52 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP.
No. 108-11, at 79 n.135 (2003). Reports using this language relate to a range of versions of
the doctrine, but none of the unenacted versions included a more direct priority statement in
the proposed legislative text.
82See Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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Congress intended to give favorable tax treatment to the kind of transaction
that would never occur absent the motive of tax avoidance."8 3
Use of this quotation is further indication that a clear showing of consis-
tency with a deliberately provided tax benefit is required to save a transaction
otherwise failing the objective or subjective inquiry of the economic sub-
stance doctrine.
The enumeration in the legislative history of two types of tax rules that may
govern in place of the economic substance doctrine further suggests that clear
application of such tax rules in place of the doctrine is required.
2. Specific Incentives, Such As Credit Incentives
The legislative history makes clear that properly utilized credits or similar
incentives are not disallowed under the economic substance doctrine. The
JCT Report specifically provides that "it is not intended that a tax credit . . .
be disallowed in a transaction pursuant to which, in form and substance, a
taxpayer makes the type of investment or undertakes the type of activity that
the credit was intended to encourage."" The JCT Report lists as examples the
low-income housing credit, the production tax credit, the new markets tax
credit, the rehabilitation credit, and the energy credit." The JCT Report does
not, however, describe this list as a blanket carve-out. 6 A purposive analysis
of the claimed credit provision is indicated through the language specifying
that the transaction must conform "in form and substance" to the incentive. 7
Multiple reports, including the JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means
Report, cite to Regulation section 1.269-2, which sets out circumstances
13JCT REP., supra note 67, at 371 n.998; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 289 n.114
(2009). This same quotation appears in the other committee reports issued following the Fed-
eral Circuit's decision. S. REP. No. 110-206, at 90 n. 117 (2007); S. REP. No. 109-336, at 137
n.270 (2006).
84JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378-79 n.1034.
"Id. The Third Circuit recently used substance-over-form principles to determine that Pit-
ney-Bowes could not receive the benefits of rehabilitation tax credits generated in a partnership
because Pitney-Bowes was not substantively a partner. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Com-
missioner, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012). The Tax Court had permitted the credits after applica-
tion of the economic substance doctrine. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner, 136
TC. 1 (2011). The Third Circuit did not reach the economic substance doctrine issue. Historic
Boardwalk Hall, 694 E3d at 448 n.50. A redacted Field Attorney Advice memorandum simi-
larly treated a party to an arrangement that effectively sold rehabilitation tax credits as being a
nonpartner; the memorandum also, however, pointedly disagreed with the Tax Court's holding
in Historic Boardwalk regarding the economic substance doctrine and concluded that the part-
nership lacked a nontax business purpose and was a sham. Historic Rehabilitation Partnership a
Sham, IRS Concludes, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 41-18 (Mar. 1, 2013).
6JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378 n.1035.
"Id. at 378 n.1034.
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under which a "deduction, credit, or other allowance becomes unavailable."8 8
Under this Regulation, the effect of the deduction or credit must not dis-
tort the liability of the particular taxpayer when the essential nature of the
transaction or situation is examined in the light of the basic purpose or plan
designed by Congress." The citation in the committee reports suggests that
similar considerations should determine whether a transaction is governed by
a particular credit provision or instead may be subjected to the economic sub-
stance doctrine. Again, this indicates that the claimed credit must be clearly
applicable to the transaction in terms not only of form but also of substance.
Statements made by individual legislators suggest that common tax rules,
if their use is consistent with their form and purpose, would not lead to
economic substance doctrine problems. For example, in a 2003 colloquy
between Senator Rockefeller and Senator Baucus, Senator Baucus, as a
cosponsor of the associated bill, assured Senator Rockefeller "that the new
markets tax credit would not be adversely affected" by codification of the
doctrine."o And in 2009, Senator Levin, as co-sponsor of a bill, explained,
"Abusive tax shelters . .. are very different from legitimate tax shelters, such as
deducting the interest paid on a home mortgage or Congressionally approved
tax deductions for building affordable housing."' This reference to the home
"Id.; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291 n.124 (2009); see also S. REP. No. 110-206, at
92 n.126 (2007); S. REP. No. 109-336, at 139 n.278 (2006); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 223
n.366 (2005) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP No. 108-755, at 666 n.635 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP.
No. 108-192, at 86 n.122 (2003).
Section 269 applies only to certain acquisitions of corporate control and certain corporate
liquidations. It is meant to prevent corporate tax attribute trafficking. James C. Warner et al.,
C Corporations, BNA TAx MGMT. PORT. (BNA) 750-2nd, n.775 (2001).
"Reg. § 1.269-2.
9150 CONG. REc. S5191 (daily ed. May 11, 2004) (cosponsor of Jumpstart Our Business
Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. (2003)).
91155 CONG. REc. S2625 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. Levin) (relating to the
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 401 (2009)). Representative Poe, an oppo-
nent of the doctrine, did include in a congressional statement an anecdote involving a purchase
by a sole proprietor and concluding that "[i]f the IRS decides he bought the new wrecker just
to go fishing in it, they won't allow the tax write-off' using the economic substance doctrine.
155 CONG. REc. H12430 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (relating to the Affordable Health Care
for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 562 (2009)). The inability to claim deprecia-
tion for personal use assets is, however, well established; the economic substance doctrine is
unnecessary and in any case is not applicable to personal transactions, a section which was in
the proposed version to which Representative Poe referred. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(B) (2010).
Conversely, the ability to claim depreciation for business use assets is "clearly consistent" with
the Code, to use the phrases from the committee reports cited supra Part III.B. 1. The burden
is on the taxpayer to substantiate business use. See Temp. Reg. § 1.274-5T.
Representative Poe's comment may have been influenced by a general distrust of the health
care reform package. At the same time, as this Article argues, the statutory limits on the tax
agencies' examination discretion are sufficiently low that an agent could test a sole proprietor's
depreciation deductions under the economic substance doctrine, but in the absence of any
additional complicating facts, the prudent course would be not to use the economic substance
doctrine.
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mortgage interest deduction is striking because it suggests that the transac-
tions most unlikely to be subject to the doctrine are those that squarely come
within the scope of a clearly expressed, well entrenched tax benefit. When it
comes to specific credits and deductions, the history provides only easy cases
for purposes of identifying safe transactions.92
The two earliest bills dealing with economic substance actually contained
a short angel list in the form of a list of credits," but such lists do not appear
in later versions. The reason for the disappearance is not addressed directly
in the legislative history but could relate to a concern that including enu-
merated statutory exceptions would merely provide determined tax avoiders
with new building blocks for shelters. Indirect support for this argument
comes from the history surrounding an unenacted provision on leases. Most
unenacted bills proposed from 2001 through 2009 did contain a specific
provision applicable to lessors of tangible property whereby profit potential
would be tested without regard to common tax benefits such as depreciation
9 2See infra note 93.
9 3Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2000, H.R. 3874, 106th Cong. § 266 (2000); Abusive
Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999). Both bills listed four
credits: a "credit for producing fuel from a nonconventional source," "low-income housing
credit," a credit for "electricity produced from certain renewable resources," and a "credit to
holders of qualified zone academy bonds or any similar program hereafter enacted." In addi-
tion, the bills allowed inclusion of "[a] ny other tax benefit specified in regulations."
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and tax credits.94 Beginning in 2007, some bill proposals omitted the provi-
sion regarding lessors," and, of course, the final codified version contains no
such provision.9 6
The absence of a lease-specific provision from the final codified version
and some earlier versions is not explained directly in the committee reports;
the JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report both state that "[l]easing
transactions, like all other types of transactions, will continue to be analyzed
in light of all the facts and circumstances."9 7 The change appears to be related
to congressional concern regarding elaborate leasing schemes.98 In Novem-
ber 2007, Senator Conrad explained, in support of a bill omitting the lease
"There were three distinct versions. One categorically stated that benefits of depreciation or
of any tax credits would be ignored in calculating the expected net tax benefits. This was found
in 15 bills, with dates ranging from 2001 to 2007. See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act
of 2001, H.R. 2520, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001); Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown and Taxpayer
Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 2345, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007). The sole committee
report relating to this version listed "the rehabilitation tax credit and the low income housing
tax credit" as credits not taken into account. The report also specified that "a traditional lever-
aged lease is not affected by the bill to the extent it meets the present law standards. S. REP. No.
108-11, at 80 (2003); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 48 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
The second provided that regulations would determine whether a lessor satisfied the profit
requirement. This version is found in four bills, all dating to 2003. See, e.g., Jobs & Growth
Reconciliation Tax Act of 2003, S.1054, 108th Cong. § 301 (as placed on Senate calendar,
May 13, 2003). The committee report associated with this version provided instruction as to
the content of the regulations: "A lessor of tangible property subject to a qualified lease shall
be considered to have satisfied the profit test . . . . [A] 'qualified lease' is a lease that satisfies
the factors for advance ruling purposes as provided by the Treasury Department." H.R. REP.
No. 108-126, at 48 (2003) (Conf. Rep.). The report then also specified that the tax benefit
measurement should not include certain deductions or credits, including "the rehabilitation
tax credit and the low income housing tax credit." Id. This report also concluded that "a tradi-
tional leveraged lease is not affected . . . to the extent it meets the present law standards." Id.
The third version specified that depreciation, credits, or any other deduction "as provided in
guidance by the Secretary" would be ignored in calculating the expected net tax benefits. This
version was by far the most popular, appearing in 31 bills from mid-2003 through the begin-
ning of 2009. See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong.
§ 401 (2003); Julia Carson Responsible Fatherhood & Healthy Families Act of 2009, H.R.
2979, 111th Cong. § 204 (2009). Committee reports relating to this third version provide the
same examples of credits (e.g., "the rehabilitation tax credit and the low income housing tax
credit") but do not include the statement regarding the safety of traditional leveraged leases.
See S. REP. No. 109-336, at 140 (2006); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 225 (2006) (Conf. Rep.);
H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 668 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); S REP. No. 108-192, at 88 (2003).
"See, e.g, Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007, S. 2242, 110th
Cong. § 511 (as placed on Senate calendar, Oct. 25, 2007).
6 I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(B) (2010).
9
7JCT REP., supra note 67, at 379; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291 (2009); see also
S. REP. No. 110-206, at 93 (2007) (S. Comm. on Finance) (containing same language and
relating to bill omitting lessor provision).
"These comments relate to SILO (sale-in, lease-out) and LILO (lease-in, lease-out) transac-
tions. See Notice 2005-13, 2005-1 C.B. 630 (SILOs); Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760
(LILOs). Both are listed transactions. See Notice 2009-59, 2009-2 C.B. 170 (2009); supra note
39; infja notes 286-90 (discussing "listed transactions").
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provision, that the bill "revokes tax benefits for leasing foreign subways and
sewers."99 He continued:
I know this is hard to believe, but there are actually companies and indi-
viduals who are reducing their U.S. taxes by buying foreign sewer systems,
depreciating them on the books for U.S. tax purposes, and leasing those
sewer systems back to the European cities that built them in the first place.100
If enacted, the special profit calculation rule for leasing transactions would
not have protected such schemes, but the rule could have been used by pro-
moters as cover. The removal of the leasing language thus hints at an inten-
tion to promote flexibility and to avoid handing new weapons to promoters.
The absence of a statutory list of specific credits or other tax incentives may
have been guided by similar concerns.
3. Basic Business Transactions
In addition to the mention of specific credits and deductions discussed
above, the JCT Report does contain examples of slightly more complex busi-
ness transactions that are unlikely to be abusive tax shelters. Thus, the JCT
Report explained that the provision was "not intended to alter the tax treat-
ment of certain basic business transactions." 0 ' The JCT Report contains a
noninclusive list of four examples:
(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or
equity; (2) a U.S. person's choice between utilizing a foreign corporation
or a domestic corporation to make a foreign investment; (3) the choice
to enter a transaction or series of transactions that constitute a corporate
organization or reorganization under subchapter C; and (4) the choice to
utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that the arm's length
standard of section 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied.'o2
This same list of examples appears in the 2009 Ways and Means Report'0 3
and also in a 2007 report by the Senate Committee on Finance.104 The
appearance of this list in the committee reports coincides with the timing
of the disappearance of the specific legislative language on leasing, and, as
alluded to above, the reports further provide that leasing transactions were to
be analyzed in light of all facts and circumstances.' 0
The "basic business transactions" list differs from the credits and deduc-
tions discussed in the prior section because business transactions generally
99153 CONG. REc. S14602 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2007) (relating to support of Senate amend-
ment to Food and Energy Security Act of 2007, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. (engrossed Senate
amendment, Dec. 14, 2007)).
100153 CONG. REc. S14602 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2007).
o"JCT REP., supra note 67, at 379.
102 d
10 3H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291 (2009).
104S. REP. No. 110-206, at 92 (2007).
'
0 5 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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involve an interaction of authorities rather than a single specific incentive
provision.'o6 The reports containing this list all explain that such transac-
tions are respected "under longstanding judicial and administrative practice,"
even though "the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely
or entirely based on comparative tax advantages."' 0 7 The cases cited include,
for example, a Supreme Court case regarding the separate entity status of a
corporation. "
The committee reports' discussion of basic business transactions makes
clear, however, that such transactions are not absolute safe havens from the
economic substance doctrine. The reports add two caveats (which would also
apply to simpler credit or deduction incentives): (1) "whether a particular
transaction meets the requirements for specific treatment under any of these
provisions can be a question of facts and circumstances" and (2) "the fact that
a transaction does meet the requirements for specific treatment . . . is not
determinative of whether a transaction or series of transactions of which it is
a part has economic substance."'09 A taxpayer may not escape the economic
substance doctrine through labeling an activity as a "basic business transac-
tion"; the facts and circumstances must clearly show that the transaction is in
line with existing authorities.
Individual statements in the congressional record further indicate an effort
to shield legitimate business planning, though the statements tend to carry
more political than substantive content. In 2001, for example, Representative
Doggett, as sponsor of a bill containing the doctrine, said that the doctrine
would stop "deals that are done not to achieve economic gain in a competi-
tive marketplace or for other legitimate business reasons but to generate losses
that offer a way to avoid the tax collector."" 0 Senator Baucus, as supporter of
a bill sponsored by Senator Grassley, explained in 2003, "Care has been taken
to avoid encumbering legitimate business transactions. . . . Without these
changes, honest businesses will continue to be burdened to the extent they
06JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378-79.
Io7Id, at 379; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291-92 (2009); S. REP. No. 110-206, at
92 (2007).
'osJCT REP., supra note 67, at 379; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291-92 (2009); S.
REP. No. 110-206, at 92 (2007) (citing Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 43
(1943)). Not cited is United Parcel Service ofAmerica, even though that case involved an unsuc-
cessful attempt by the government to use the economic substance doctrine to deny benefits
obtained through the strategic use of an offshore subsidiary. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 123 and 131.
09JCT REP., supra note 67, at 379. In addition, the reports cite to case law that included
analysis relating to the more general substance-over-form doctrine, thus recognizing that other
judicial doctrines may prove more helpful than the economic substance doctrine in ensuring
compliance.
10147 CONG. REc. H4023 (daily ed. July 17, 2001) (statement of Rep. Doggett) (relating
to Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 2001, H.R. 2520, 107th Cong. (2001)).
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compete against companies avoiding taxes. Tax shelters . . . are designed to
achieve unwarranted tax benefits rather than business profit.""11
4. Abusive Transactions
The previous two sections discussed the types of transactions that are not
to be targeted by the economic substance doctrine and concluded that the
legislative history emphasizes a purposive reading of the claimed tax benefits,
leaving room for the potential relevance of the doctrine even as to tax credits
and basic business tax provisions. The legislative history also includes some
guidance as to the types of transactions likely to be treated as shams under
the doctrine, though this guidance is done primarily by referring to particular
court cases.
The JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report explained that "[tflax avoid-
ance transactions have relied upon the interaction of highly technical tax law
provisions to produce tax consequences not contemplated by Congress."' 1 2
The JCT Report, 2009 Ways and Means Report, and several other commit-
tee reports also quoted approvingly from ACM Partnership:"I "The doctrine
of economic substance becomes applicable, and a judicial remedy is war-
ranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by Con-
gress, by means of transactions that serve no economic purpose other than tax
savings.""' These statements are consistent with a purposive approach requir-
ing consideration of whether Congress did foresee the claimed tax benefit or
whether the tax effects claimed by the taxpayer are unusual or surprising.
"1149 CONG. REc. S5008 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2003) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (relating
to CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. (2003)). In another statement by Sen. Baucus as
to the same bill, he further urged, "[I]t forces companies to engage in real business planning
instead of tax-driven hoaxes." 149 CONG. REc. S4930 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Baucus); see also 153 CONG. Rac. S14602 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Conrad saying that economic substance "is shutting down a bunch of tax scams that are going
on around the country"); 155 CONG. REc. S2625 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Levin) ("Abusive tax shelters are complicated transactions promoted to provide tax benefits
unintended by the tax code.").
1 2JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 290 (2008). This
sentence is not contained in the JCT Technical Explanation. See also S. REP. No. 110-206, at
91 (2007) (same as JCT Report); S. REP. No. 109-336, at 138 (2006) (S. Comm. on Finance)
(same). A similar sentiment is found in the earliest committee report-a 2003 Senate Com-
mittee on Finance Report that explained, "The Committee is concerned that many taxpayers
are engaging in tax avoidance transactions that rely on the interaction of highly technical tax
law provisions. These transactions usually produce surprising results that were not contem-
plated by Congress." S. REP. No. 108-11, at 89 (2003) (S. Comm. on Finance); S. REP. No.
108-192, at 97 (2003) (S. Comm. on Finance) (same).
I
3ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
Il
4JCT REP., supra note 67, at 370; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 287 (2009); see also S.
REP. No. 110-206, at 89 (2007) (quoting ACM P'ship v. Commissioner); S. REP. No. 109-336,
at 135-36 (2006) (same); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 220 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (same); H.R.
REP. No. 108-755, at 664 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (same); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 44 (2003)
(Conf. Rep.) (same).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 66, No. 3
573
SECTION OF TAXATION
The text of the statute, the common law history, and the legislative his-
tory together show strong congressional agreement that appropriate cases
were being litigated under the common law doctrine and disagreement with
courts-and taxpayers-that took overly narrow views of the doctrine."I The
types of transactions targeted under the common law economic substance
doctrine tended to be highly complex or to depend on unusual intersections
of tax rules with each other and with various facts."16 The Service prevailed
overwhelmingly in such cases, though not always on economic substance
grounds.'"7 The success of the Service was noted approvingly in the JCT
Report and in the 2009 Ways and Means Report: "Congress recognizes that
the IRS has achieved a number of recent successes in litigation. The Congress
believes it is still desirable to provide greater clarity . . . in order to improve
its effectiveness at deterring unintended consequences.""' These statements
also suggest congressional trust in the stance of the Treasury and the Service
on the economic substance audits and in litigation and in their prudential
administration of the codified doctrine.
Codification functioned to overrule any judges inclined to avoid use of
the doctrine on separation-of-power or textualist grounds. The JCT Report
and 2009 Ways and Means Report singled out the Coltec decision, a Court
of Federal Claims case in which a judge stated that "the use of the 'economic
substance' doctrine to trump 'mere compliance with the Code' would violate
the separation of powers.""' While the Federal Claims decision was over-
turned on appeal, a desire to avoid such future judicial assertions is implicit
in the JCT Report and in the 2009 Ways and Means Report.'20 Both reports
remarked with approval that the Federal Circuit had "overruled the Court
of Federal Claims decision, reiterating the viability of the economic sub-
stance doctrine and concluding that the transaction in question violated the
"I Nine enacted bills, including the earliest bill as well as bills into 2007, contained a "find-
ings" provision that stated, "Many corporate tax shelter transactions are complicated ways
of accomplishing nothing aside from claimed tax benefits, and the legal opinions justifying
those transactions take an inappropriately narrow and restrictive view of well-developed court
doctrines ..... See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong.
§ 2 (as introduced in House, June 17, 1999); Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown and Taxpayer
Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 2345, 110th Cong. § 101 (as introduced in House, May
16, 2007).
"
6 See Yoram Keinan, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 508-1st TAx MGMT. PORT. (BNA)
§ IX (2012) (listing economic substance doctrine cases by topic).
11 Id.
1 JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 290 (2008). These
statements are not contained in the JCT Technical Explanation. JCT REP., supra note 67, at
378; see also S. REP. No. 110-206, at 92 (2007) (same as JCT Report and 2009 Ways and
Means Report).
"'See JCT RaP., supra note 67, at 370-71; H.R. RaP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 288-89
(2009); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004), vacated, 454 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
12
0SeeJCT REP., supra note 67, at 370-71, 378; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 288-90
(2009).
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doctrine."l2 ' Coltec also appears by name in a statement made by Senator
Grassley, a sponsor of an engrossed Senate amendment to an unenacted bill:
[I]t is for Congress to do the job of making the Tax Code on economic
substance clear so the courts are not defining it, and most importantly so
that four different courts aren't defining it in four different ways ... . It will
also ensure that a court will not overturn the doctrine, as a trial judge did in
what is called the Coltec case . . . .12
The text of the statute indicates disapproval of taxpayer victories in 2001
in two circuit court decisions, Compaq Computer Corp. and IES Industries,
Inc., which involved the same basic transaction.'23 The transaction relied
for objective proof of economic substance on the presence of pretax profit,
but if foreign taxes were taken into account, there was no pretax profit.124
The appellate courts agreed with the taxpayer's argument that pretax profit
depended only on pre-U.S. tax profit. The codified doctrine evidences disap-
proval of those cases by providing that "[t] he Secretary [of the Treasury] shall
issue regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in determin-
ing pretax profit in appropriate cases." 125
This precise version of the foreign taxes provision does not appear in any
prior bill,126 but consideration of prior unenacted versions makes clear that
121JCT REP., supra note 67, at 371; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 289 (2009); see also
H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 221 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (raising the Coltec lower court decision
in section on problems in the courts).
122153 CONG. REc. S 13952 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2007) (sponsor of engrossed Senate amend-
ment to Food and Energy Security Act of 2007, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. (2007)).
'23 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus.
v. United States, 253 E3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001). The taxpayer victory most conspicuous for
its absence in the history is United Parcel Service ofAmerica, Inc. v. Commissioner., 254 F.3d
1014 (11th Cir. 2001), though the inapplicability of the doctrine to that case may have been
signaled in the JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report by virtue of the carve-out for
"basic business transactions," discussed infa Part III.B.3. See also discussion of UPS case supra
note 108 and infra note 131.
124 For discussion of the problems with the pretax profit test generally, see Luke, Risk, Return,
supra note 2, at 793-803; Mitchell Kane, Compaq and IES: Putting the Tax Back into After-tax
Income, 94 TAX NOTES (TA) 1215 (Mar. 4, 2002); Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit
Taxes and the Question of Pre-tax Profit, 26 VA. TAx REv. 821 (2007); Terrance O'Reilly, Eco-
nomics & Economic Substance, 9 Fu. TAx REV. 755 (2010); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Require-
ment ofEconomic Profit in Tax Motivated Transactions, 59 TAXES 985 (198 1).
12 51I.R.C. § 770 1(o)(2)(B). See discussion of regulations and the codified doctrine infra Parts
III.C.3, IV.B.
126 One bill contained virtually identical language except that "may" was substituted for
"shall." American Workers, State, and Business Relief Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong.
§ 421 (engrossed Senate amendment, Mar. 10, 2010).
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this is indeed a reaction to Compaq and IES.12 7 Bills proposed before those
court decisions did not contain a specific provision on foreign taxes,'28 but
following the taxpayer circuit court victories, nearly 60 bills were generated
that proposed an even stronger version than the one eventually enacted of the
foreign taxes provision.'29 In 2003, Senator Grassley, again as a sponsor of
economic substance legislation, remarked, "Last year, there were several court
rulings that, in my view, misapplied this doctrine. These rulings now stand
as legal precedent that can be used to justify abusive schemes in the future.
'
2 7See, e.g., H.R. 4213, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010); see also infra note 126 and text accom-
panying note 127. For further discussion of the Compaq and IES cases, see David P. Hariton,
The Compaq Case, Notice 98-5, and Tax Shelters: The Theory Is All Wrong, 2002 TAX NOTES
TODAY 19-30 (Jan. 29, 2002); Kane, supra note 124; William A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark, Com-
paq v. Commissioner-Where Is the TaxArbitrage?, 94 TAx NOTES (TA) 1335 (Mar. 11, 2002);
Knoll, supra note 124; Luke, Risk, Return, supra note 2, at 816-25; Daniel N. Shaviro & David
A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 26 TAX NOTES INT'L
191 (Apr. 15, 2002). The technique in these cases was foreclosed by enactment of Code section
901(k). See Luke, Risk, Return, supra note 2, at 816 n.1 11.
... Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. § 3 (as introduced
in House, June 17, 1999); Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2000, H.R. 3874, 106th Cong.
§ 266 (as introduced in House, Mar. 9, 2000).
1
2 9 The decision in IES Indus. v. United States was filed June 14, 2001. IES Indus. v. United
States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001). The first bill containing a provision on foreign taxes was
introduced in July 2003. Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 2001, H.R. 2520, 107th Cong.
§ 101 (as introduced in House, July 17, 2001). The stronger version, appearing in nearly 60
bills dating from 2001 through 2009, including the bill relating to the 2009 Ways and Means
Report, provided that "foreign taxes shall be taken into account as expenses in determining
pre-tax profit . . ." See America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th
Cong. § 452 (as introduced in House, July 14, 2009) (the complete list of bills containing this
version is on file with author). A handful of bills even after 2001 had no foreign taxes provi-
sion at all. See, e.g., Food and Energy Security Act of 2007, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 12521
(engrossed Senate amendment, Dec. 14, 2007). But, as will be discussed below, all bill ver-
sions, other than the one enacted, also had a specific provision regarding regulatory authority.
See infra Part III.C.3.
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Today's clarification is intended to overturn those rulings.""o It seems likely
he was referring to the 2001 circuit court cases on foreign taxes, although
since no case names are given, and the timing is not quite right, this cannot
be said with certainty.'31 In any event, Senator Grassley's comments reflect the
view that the tax agencies were targeting transactions that merited economic
substance doctrine scrutiny prior to codification.
5. The Practical Effect of "Clearly Consistent" on Interpretation
The legislative history material discussed above indicates that the economic
substance doctrine will not be relevant if the taxpayer shows that the transac-
tion is clearly consistent with both the form and purpose of the tax rules that
are claimed to apply. This reading limits the ability of taxpayers to make argu-
ments that transactions should be permitted unless expressly disallowed by
the Code. To put it another way, Congress failing to say "no" to a particular
transaction is not an acceptable defense to application of the economic sub-
stance doctrine. The legislative history suggests that taxpayers must instead
show that Congress said "yes" to a particular tax benefit and to the structure
used to obtain it.
For most taxpayers, this direction found in the legislative history will be
inconsequential because commonplace transactions will be clearly consistent
with congressional intent. Even in the unlikely event that the tax agencies were
dramatically to shift to applying the economic substance doctrine to a wide-
range of commonplace, albeit tax-motivated, transactions, such an approach
130 149 CONG. REc. S4930 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2003) (sponsor of CARE Act of 2003, S. 476,
108th Cong. (2003)). Although Senator Grassley, a Republican, was a sponsor of several bills
containing the economic substance doctrine, he did not ultimately vote for its enactment.
This is almost certainly because codification of the doctrine became enmeshed in the health
care legislation. For example, the "job killer" epithet was used against the economic substance
doctrine in the course of health care debate. See 155 CONG. REc. H12598 (daily ed. Nov. 7,
2009) (statement of Rep. Sessions); 155 CONG. REc. H12258 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 2009) (state-
ment of Rep. Foxx).
Early economic substance doctrine bills had some bipartisan support. Senators Coleman,
Frist, Inhofe, Kyl, McCain, McConnell, Santorum, and Nickles all brought forward amend-
ments that included codification of the doctrine, though most such proffers occurred in the
context of a pressing need to address an unfavorable ruling by the World Trade Organization.
See 150 CONG. REc. S809 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 2004) (statement of Sen. Inhofe); 150 CONG.
REc. S5095 (statements of Sens. Kyl and McCain); 150 CONG. Rac. S3797 (daily ed. Apr.
6, 2004) (statements of Senators Kyl, Santorum, and Lieberman); 150 CONG. REc. S3633
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 2004) (statement of Sen. Frist); 150 CONG. REC. S3004 (daily ed. Mar. 23,
2004) (statements of Sens. Kyl and Nickles); 150 CONG. REc. S2867 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2004)
(statement of Sen. McConnell on behalf of Sen. Frist); 150 CONG. REc. S2111 (daily ed. Mar.
3, 2004) (statements of Sens. Grassley and Baucus, Santorum, and Lieberman); 151 CONG.
REc. S9472 (daily ed. July 29, 2005) (statement of Sens. Coleman, Levin, and Obama); see
also David L. Brumbaugh, CRS Report Summarizes History ofFSC/ETI Controversy, 2004 TAX
NOTEs TODAY 232-16.
'
3
' See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Another 2001 taxpayer victory occurred in
United Parcel Service ofAmerica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001). See also
supra notes 109 and 123.
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would not survive judicial scrutiny. The legislative history's emphasis on the
taxpayer's burden could, however, be critical to an analysis of whether the
economic substance doctrine treated uncommon, tax-motivated transactions
as substantive shams. In the difficult cases, judicial approaches to statutory
interpretation, including willingness to accept legislative history, could create
judicial splits as to the ultimate relevance of the economic substance doctrine
to particular transactions.
If confronted with a conflict between a claim by the taxpayer that a tax
benefit is allowed by the Code and a claim by the Service of the relevance
of the economic substance doctrine, a textualist judgel32 may turn to a com-
monly used canon: "If there is a conflict between a general provision and a
specific provision, the specific provision prevails."l33 If the specific provision
applies, a textualist will use it over the more general doctrine. A textualist
will, however, in turn interpret that more specific provision using the tools of
textualism and thus also discount any legislative history that may shed light
1
32 The textualist judge that is assumed for purposes of the discussion in this Article is
something of a caricature but shares traits with other well-known textualists: text is primary;
legislative history is anathema; text should be considered in context, including objective pur-
poses discernible from the context; dictionaries may be used, with caution, if they reflect the
background lexicon from which legislators were working; and canons of construction may be
used, but also with caution and with greater trust in canons having do to with interpreting
grammar and context. See CROSS, supra note 20, at 51; see also supra note 24 (listing textualism
authorities). See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAw: THE INTER-
PRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTs (2012) (discussing the textualist interpretive method). The book
by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner spurred a strong critique by Judge Richard Posner. Richard
A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, But the Letter Giveth Life, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012,
at 18. Posner's critique was followed by a retort by Justice Scalia. See Terry Baynes, Fanning
Furor, justice Scalia Says Appeals Court Judge Lied, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-usa-court-scalia-idUSBRE88HO6X20120918. Justice Sca-
lia's accusation led to a response by Judge Posner. See Richard Posner, RichardPosner Responds to
Antonin Scalias Accusation ofLying, THE NEw REPUBLIC (Sep. 20, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/
blog/plank/I 07549/richard-posner-responds-antonin-scalias-accusation-lying#.
133 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 132, at 183; see also ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 20,
at 275. The use of statutory canons of construction is itself problematic. See, e.g., Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on The Theory ofAppellate Decision and The Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
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on the purpose of that more specific provision.' As alluded to above, for
commonplace transactions, the end result should not vary depending on the
judicial approach to interpretation. 135
The cases where it is easy to determine that the economic substance doc-
trine does not apply are also those where it is highly likely that textualist tools
of statutory construction would provide the same answer as an analysis mak-
ing full use of the historical context. 136 As discussed above, the legislative his-
tory is also clearest with respect to the easy cases, while it provides much less
certainty as to which types of transactions are abusive.137 The "clearly consis-
tent" direction provides guidance to courts and to tax agencies in their audit
and examination functions, but it is open-ended guidance, leaving much to
the discretion of the court with the final say on the transaction (consideration
of the effect of tax agency rulemaking is deferred to Part IV). 138 The effect
of the "clearly consistent" direction on the tax agencies' audit and litigation
functions will thus be almost entirely prudential. As will be argued more fully
*'See CRoss, supra note 20, at 85; ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 228. Because the
economic substance doctrine targets tax avoidance transactions, there may also be the possi-
bility of judicial lenity, even though most economic substance cases do not contain even civil
tax fraud allegations. Tax avoidance transactions are near cousins of fraudulent and criminal
tax evasion. The strict liability penalty may further highlight that relationship in economic
substance doctrine cases. See Kaye, supra note 12, at 600-04 (discussing controversy regarding
strict liability penalty). There is thus some possibility that a court would subtly (or not so sub-
tly) undermine the generally applicable standard of proof in civil cases. See also Kristin E. Hick-
man, OfLenity, Chevron and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905, 911-32 (2007) (discussing tension
between rule of lenity canon and deference doctrines in tax shelter cases); Steve R. Johnson,
The Canon 7hat Tax Penalties Should Be Strictly Construed, 3 NEv. L.J. 495, 522-24 (2003).
A more tax-specific canon is, however, in tension with any inclination to permit claimed tax
benefits because of ambiguity in the governing tax law. That canon specifies that "exemptions
from taxation are not to be implied; they must be unambiguously proved." See Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 20, at 1296 (quoting Justice Brennan's majority opinion in United States
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351 (1988)); see also Johnson, supra at 495 (listing various tax
canons).
135The taxpayer generally has the burden of proof. Code section 7491 does shift the burden
in a relatively narrow set of circumstances, and, of course, then only as to factual issues. See
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 223, 223 n.54; Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers ofSymbolic
Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-ProofRules, 84 IowA L. REV. 413, 414
(1999). The burden may also shift if formal tax fraud is alleged, if the government raises certain
affirmative defenses, or as to matters not raised in the notice of tax deficiency. I.R.C § 7454;
Johnson, supra note 135, at 485; see Richardson et al., supra note 7, at 223.
This Article does not address directly whether the economic substance determination is
a question of law, fact, or mixed law and fact, although it assumes a legal component as to
which tax agencies could issue interpretive regulations. The economic substance doctrine tests
the boundaries between such categories because the doctrine involves a judgment call about
whether a specific factual situation should legally be treated as real or not real. See Christopher
M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the Standard ofReview, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339, 341
(2009).
136See Cross, supra note 20, at 52, 139; EsKIDGE, JR., supra note 20, at 207-38.
137See discussion supra Parts III.B.2-3.
B'See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
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in the next set of sections, the relevance provision did not impose unique
restraints on these functions.139
Consider a hypothetical situation in which Congress has enacted a tax
credit for the installation of solar panels. 140 A taxpayer has complied with the
terms for obtaining the credit, but he would never have installed solar panels
in the absence of the credit. If the Service attempted to argue on audit that
this taxpayer failed the subjective inquiry of the economic substance doctrine,
courts would find for the taxpayer and would also likely hold that the gov-
ernment was not "substantially justified" in its position, thus possibly paving
the way for the awarding of costs and fees to a taxpayer.141 The court might
make a reference to the legislative history to support its rulings, but the same
result is fairly certain even without use of the history, given the specificity of
the credit provision when contrasted with the economic substance provision.
Imagine if the taxpayer had instead engaged in a much more elaborate
transaction that derived tax benefits from the complex operation of multi-
ple provisions, one small portion of which included use of the solar panel
'39 See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
1olt should be noted that the solar panel hypotheticals that follow are not based on actual
tax cases; indeed, because tax credits signal a congressionally approved deviation from the stan-
dard tax computation, it would require an exceptional set of facts for the economic substance
doctrine to pose a problem. General substance-over-form doctrines (e.g., beneficial ownership,
status of a partner) are far more likely to control in the event of suspected tax avoidance. See,
e.g., Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner, 694 E3d 425, 460-63 (3d Cir. 2012)
(determining that taxpayer was not a partner and thus not eligible for a tax credit alloca-
tion); supra note 85. A Field Attorney Advice memorandum did, however, make a point of
distinguishing Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1995), a case evaluating economic
substance using an after-tax calculation because of the use of a solar panel tax credit. Historic
Rehabilitation Partnership a Sham, IRS Concludes, 2013 TAX NOTEs TODAY 41-18 (Mar. 1,
2013). The memorandum did not address the codified doctrine, but it did draw a distinction
between congressional intent "to encourage the underlying activity ... [and an intent regard-
ing] the structure of this transaction." Id. Placing the burden on the taxpayer to show clear con-
sistency with congressional intent is supported by the legislative history. And this Article uses
a credit example to explore the outer boundaries of the comments in the legislative materials
regarding credits and other basic business decisions. See supra Part III.B.3.
W Under Code section 7430, in order to recover such costs and fees, the taxpayer must sat-
isfy various hurdles, including exhaustion of administrative remedies. See RicHARDsoN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 126, 231-33 (discussing Code section 7430); Danshera Cords, Tax Protesters
and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1515, 1569-70 (2005) (noting exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement); Doran,
supra note 40, at 122 (substantially justified "standard requires nothing more than that the
government have a one-in-five chance of prevailing on the merits."). See generally Jeffrey E.
Quijano & Rodney P. Mock, IR. C 5 7430 Attorney's Fees: Navigating Section 7430 andA Call
for The FinalAct, 15 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 731 (2010) (discussing various obstacles to a
taxpayer's collection of attorney's fees).
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credit. 142 The taxpayer then argues that the solar panel credit statute protects
the entire gambit and that, at the very least, the panel credit should not be
touched even if the rest of the edifice crumbles under the economic substance
doctrine. On audit and in litigation, the Service argues for a broad view of
"transaction" that takes away all the tax benefits, including the solar panel
credit. In this situation, and in the absence of regulations on the definition
of "transaction," the outcome is likely to be at least somewhat dependent
on the particular view of the judge deciding the case. 143 Variability of result
is, however, consistent with the open-ended nature of the common-law-like
approach embodied in the relevance provision.
A textualist, lower court judge may conclude that so long as the solar panels
were actually installed, then the solar panel activity is a separate transaction
and the credit stands. The judge should, however, also be more reluctant to
award the taxpayer court costs. 144 Some textualist judges may take a peek
at congressional materials regarding the scope of the economic substance
doctrine. But such a peek is unlikely to persuade the judge of having made
the wrong decision; while the legislative history of the codified economic
substance doctrine suggests that the taxpayer must demonstrate that Con-
gress has said "yes" to the disputed transaction, the history does not expressly
specify an interpretive method to use when evaluating congressional intent
with respect to the claimed tax benefit. A textualist judge may decide that the
taxpayer has persuasively shown that a particular narrow transaction-instal-
lation of the panels-was clearly consistent with the tax credit provision, as
interpreted using textualist tools.
Consider, however, if the reviewing appellate panel is comprised of judges
who adhere more to a pragmatic, dynamic model of statutory interpretation.
Such judges will consider the legislative history for what it has to offer but are
also more likely to agree that the economic substance doctrine is necessary to
the integrity of the tax system. The appellate judges may determine that the
"clearly consistent" requirement means the taxpayer has not prevailed and
may cite language contained in committee reports-for example, language
indicating congressional disapproval of unanticipated interactions of tax
rules. 145 As cases accumulate, the doctrine and the relevance provision would
gradually acquire greater content, and the doctrine would be developing "in
the same manner" as it developed before enactment.
142For example, the taxpayer could "partner" with a tax-exempt entity in a partnership that
would funnel the credits to the taxpayer. See Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner, in
which the court denied the benefit of rehabilitation credits under general substance-over-form
doctrine, reversing the lower court, which had rejected the applicability of the economic sub-
stance doctrine. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner, 694 E3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012).
'
43 See CROss, supra note 20, at 159-79 (discussing intersection of ideology, approach to
statutory interpretation, and case outcomes).
'
44 See Doran, supra note 40, at 122.
145 This Article does not take a position as to the appropriate standard of review on appeal.
For a discussion of this issue, see Pietruszkiewicz, supra note 135, at 350-76.
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C. Judicial Discretion As to Ultimate Relevance and Implications for
Agency Guidance
The interpretive conclusion reached in this section is less straightforwardly
contained in the legislative history than the "clearly consistent" directive dis-
cussed above. This section will argue that the best reconciliation of the text,
related statutes, and the legislative history is obtained through an interpreta-
tion under which courts retain final discretion as to whether a specific trans-
action ultimately fails the economic substance doctrine. This is, at its core,
of course, simply an assertion that the codified economic substance doctrine
functions essentially the same as any other statutory tax provision-with the
courts being the final arbiters of the tax owed but with the agencies having
substantial ability to constrain judicial discretion through regulations. The
practical effects of this constraint, as well as a brief discussion of its path
through the Chevron line of cases regarding judicial deference, are explored
in Part IV.
1. Uniform Phrasing ofa Standard
Codification of the economic substance doctrine has set a uniform phras-
ing for the two inquiries and for the requisite showing of pretax profit.1 6
The statute also makes clear that failure of either the subjective or objective
inquiry will result in loss of tax benefits."' In choosing among the various
phrasings present in the circuit courts, the codified language generally uses
the version that was considered more robust in terms of the ability of gov-
ernment to use the doctrine in targeting abusive transactions. For example,
both the JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report describe a "narrower
approach used by some courts" through which a transaction would survive
if either the objective or subjective inquiry were met.' Similarly, the JCT
Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report discuss how some cases allowed
a "nominal amount" of pretax profit to carry a transaction." 9 Earlier reports
reflect this same concern.'10
Although uniformity was of clear importance, uniformity achieved through
codification was not meant to disrupt judicial flexibility. The concern was in
having a uniform standard, not in providing uniform answers to whether
'
4 6See Luke, supra note 2, at 115-20.
11
7Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409,
124 Stat. 1029, 1068.
'
48JCT REP., supra note 67, at 370; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 288 (2009).
"
9JCT REP., supra note 67, at 372; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 289-90 (2009).
1
5 0 See S. REP. No. 110-206, at 90-91 (2007) (S. Comm. on Finance); S. REP. No. 109-336,
at 137 (2006) (S. Comm. on Finance); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 222, 222 n.361 (2006)
(Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 665 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No. 108-192, at
85 (2003) (S. Comm. on Finance); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 46 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); S.
REP. No. 108-11, at 78 (2003) (S. Comm. on Finance).
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specific, future transactions would fail or survive the doctrine.' The JCT
Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report state, "A strictly rule-based tax sys-
tem cannot efficiently prescribe the appropriate outcome of every conceivable
transaction that might be devised and is, as a result, incapable of preventing
all unintended consequences."l5 2 These reports then go on to explain that the
common law economic substance doctrine was a standard, not a rule: "Many
courts have long recognized the need to supplement tax rules with anti-tax-
avoidance standards, such as the economic substance doctrine, in order to
assure the Congressional purpose is achieved."' Both reports also recognize
that "[a]lthough these doctrines serve an important role in the administration
of the tax system, they can be seen as at odds with an objective, 'rule-based'
system of taxation.""' The same or similar observations appear in several ear-
lier committee reports as well."'
The JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report quote from the rel-
evance provision in the context of a discussion of court flexibility and unifor-
mity. The JCT Report explains:
[The provision] does not alter the flexibility of the courts in other respects.
The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant
to a transaction is made in the same manner as if the provision had never
been enacted. Thus, the provision does not change present law standards in
determining when to utilize an economic substance analysis.' 56
O' See S. REP. No. 108-192, at 86 (2003) ("[T]he Committee is concerned that ... taxpay-
ers are subject to different legal standards based on the circuit that the taxpayer is located.
Thus, the Committee believes it is appropriate to clarify for the courts the appropriate stan-
dards to use in determining whether a transaction has economic substance."); S. REP. No.
108-11, at 78 (2003) (same).
1
52JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 290 (2009). The JCT
Technical Explanation does not contain this statement.
1
53JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 290 (2009). The JCT
Technical Explanation does not contain this statement.
The text of the codified doctrine, and all earlier bills save two, contains a definition of
economic substance doctrine that emphasizes its common law roots: The term "economic
substance doctrine" means the common law doctrine under which tax benefits with respect to
a transaction are not allowable. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A). Common law can, of course, develop
rules as well as standards, but the common law of economic substance doctrine was far more a
standard than a rule. See Luke, Risk, Return, supra note 2, at 797-98.
1
54JCT REP., supra note 67, at 369; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 287 (2009).
55S. REP. No. 110-206, at 88, 92 (2007) (same as JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means
Report); S. REP. No. 109-336, at 138 (2006) (same); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 220
(2006) (Conf. Rep.) (containing only observation that "invocation of these doctrines can be
seen as at odds with an objective, 'rule-based' system of taxation"); S. REP. No. 108-192, at
83 (2003); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 44 (2003) (Conf Rep.) (same); S. REP. No. 108-11,
at 76 (2003) (same).
1
56JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378. The JCT Technical Explanation omits the sentence "the
provision does not change such a transaction;" thus, it is the same as the 2009 Ways and Means
Report as to this passage.
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The footnote in the JCT Report appearing at the end of the last sentence
of this quotation contains the "consistent with the Congressional purpose"
statement discussed above,'17 thereby providing support for the linkage of the
proposed constraint to the relevance provision text.
The statement in the 2009 Ways and Means Report is the same except
that it omits the sentence "the provision does not change such transac-
tion," and the footnote regarding consistency is also differently worded, as
discussed above.' The additional sentence in the JCT Report appears to
relate to a footnote appearing in material not quoted above but immediately
preceding it. That footnote explained that "'transaction' includes a series of
transactions,"'5 9 suggesting that the sentence indicates that flexibility is also
preserved as to whether activities should be grouped into a single transaction
or not.'60 Earlier committee reports relate to bills that did not contain the rel-
evance provision, but they generally contain similar language-for example,
"[t]he provision provides a uniform definition of economic substance, but
does not alter the flexibility of the courts in other respects. . . . Thus, the pro-
vision does not change current law standards used by courts in determining
when to utilize an economic substance analysis."'' In the quotation above,
language regarding consistency appeared at the ellipsis.162
2. Preliminary Determination to Tax Agencies and Ultimate Determination
to Courts
The precise language of the relevance provision is central to this section:
The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant
to a transaction is made in the same manner as if this subsection had never
been enacted.163 Dictionary definitions, for example, suggest that the word
'
57See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
'
58H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 291 (2009).
'
59JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378 n.1033.
'"The bill for which the 2009 Ways and Means Report was prepared did not contain a
provision on series, whereas the final codified text did. A similar point regarding the ability of
courts to aggregate and disaggregate is, however, contained in the JCT Report, 2009 Ways and
Means Reports, and several others. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
161 S. REP. No. 110-206, at 92 (2007) (S. Comm. on Finance); see S. REP. No. 109-336, at
138-39 (2006) (S. Comm. on Finance) ("The provision does not change current law standards
used by courts in determining when to utilize an economic substance analysis ... . The provi-
sion provides a uniform definition of economic substance, but does not alter the flexibility of
the courts in other respects."); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 223 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (same);
H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 666 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (same); S. REP. No. 108-192, at 86
(2003) (S. Comm. on Finance); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 46 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP.
No. 108-11, at 79 (2003) (S. Comm. on Finance).
162S. REP. No. 110-206, at 92 (2007); see S. REP. No. 109-336, at 138-39 (2006) ("clearly
contemplated" language appearing in footnote immediately preceding material on unifor-
mity); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 223 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (same); H.R REP No. 108-755, at
666 (2004) (same); S REP. No. 108-192, at 86 (2004); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 46 (2003)
(Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No. 108-11, at 79 (2003).
'
63I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
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"relevant" indicates a fairly low threshold-only that there be some "logical
connection" between the doctrine and the transaction." This meaning is
contained in the relevance provision, and the legislative history indicates that
the agencies have primary oversight over preliminary decisions regarding the
presence of a possible connection between a transaction and the economic
substance doctrine.' 5 This assignment is, of course, also consistent with the
general audit and litigation functions held by the tax agencies.' 6
In addition to "relevant" indicating a possible connection between the doc-
trine and a transaction, this section argues that the relevance provision also
touches on whether a final connection will be made between the doctrine and
a transaction-that is, whether the doctrine will ultimately be found relevant
or not relevant. This is the question of most interest to taxpayers and tax prac-
titioners. Audits and litigation unquestionably impose burdens on taxpayers,
but the "when" question of most concern is when will a transaction ulti-
mately fail or survive the application of the economic substance doctrine? The
legislative history suggests that this meaning is also present in the relevance
provision and that the decision as to the ultimate relevance of the economic
substance doctrine to a transaction belongs to the courts. 67
a. Evolution of Relevance. An understanding of the appearance of
the relevance provision requires consideration of two competing versions of
the introductory language for the statute.'6 The first appears in a Novem-
'"4BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) provides the following definition of "relevant":
"Logically connected and tending to prove or disprove a matter in issue; having appreciable
probative value-that is, rationally tending to persuade people of the probability or possibility of
some alleged facts." See also OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcroNARY (2d ed. 1989) ("relevant: L.a. Bearing
upon, connected with, pertinent to, the matter in hand."); WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTL Dic-
TIONARY (3d ed. 1993) ("relevant: 1: bearing upon or properly applying to the matter at hand:
affording evidence tending to prove or disprove the matters at issue or under discussion: perti-
nent."); MERRIAM WEBSTERS ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/relevant ("a: having significant and demonstrable bearing on the matter at hand. b: affording
evidence tending to prove or disprove the matter at issue or under discussion.").
For a discussion of the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation (particularly textual-
ism), see, for example, Ellen P. Aprill, The Law ofthe Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon
Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFFALO L.
REv. 227 (1999).
'65 Under certain conditions, courts may raise the doctrine sua sponte. Indeed, the doctrine
had its origins in judicial decisions. See supra Part II.
'
66See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 7.
'
67 See infra Part II.B.
'6'One other version of this introductory language is present in the unenacted bills. It is
found in 21 bills from 2001 through mid-2007 and provides, "In applying the economic
substance doctrine, the determination of whether a transaction has economic substance shall
be made as provided in this paragraph." See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 2001,
H.R. 2520, 107th Cong. § 101 (as introduced in House, July 17, 2001); Abusive Tax Shelter
Shutdown and Taxpayer Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 2345, 110th Cong. § 101 (as intro-
duced in House, May 16, 2007). This third version does not appear to have much bearing on
the introduction of the relevance provision.
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ber 2003 bill and then is found in 39 bills through February 2010.169 The
introductory language is as follows: "In any case in which a court determines
that the economic substance doctrine is relevant for purposes of this title to
a transaction (or series of transactions), such transaction (or series of transac-
tions) shall have economic substance only if the requirements of this para-
graph are met." 7 0
The appearance of a second version of this introductory language occurred
in tandem with the appearance of the "never been enacted" relevance provi-
sion; thus, the second version of the introductory language appeared in Octo-
ber 2007 and competed with the first, court-determination version up until
the enactment bill."'7 This second version appeared in nine bills, including
the one enacted into law.172 The second version of the introductory language
provides, "In the case of any transaction to which the economic substance
doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic sub-
stance only if [two inquiries are met]." 7 1
In the fall of 2007, after multiple years of attempting to get economic sub-
stance codified over opposition, Senator Grassley, as cosponsor of an engrossed
Senate amendment, introduced an innovation-not to the main economic
substance doctrine provision but to the proposed penalty provision. He called
the change "an improved version [that] has modifications made in response to
concerns of taxpayers that codification would throw legitimate tax planning
into question and allow the IRS to substitute its business judgment for that
of the taxpayers." 171 In his words:
We have heard complaints that a strict liability penalty will cause IRS field
agents to overreach and courts to be reluctant to apply the doctrine. These
are serious concerns, and we have addressed those concerns by requiring the
IRS to nationally coordinate through the Chief Counsel's Office when the
penalty is asserted and/or when it is compromised. This procedure is similar
to a process currently used by the IRS to designate cases for litigation.
As a protective measure, taxpayers will be permitted to make their case to
the IRS at the national level before a penalty is asserted. Of course, cases
involving the economic substance doctrine should be going through Chief
Counsel anyway, and taxpayers currently have the ability to persuade the
IRS not to assert a penalty. But because of the strict liability nature of this
'
69 H.R. 3650, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003).
70Eg., S. 2955, 111th Cong. § 2955 (2010).
'See, e.g., Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3501 (as
introduced in House, Oct. 25, 2007); American Workers, State, and Business Relief Act of
2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 421 (engrossed Senate amendment, Mar. 10, 2010).
1
72 E.g., I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2010).
73See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(o).
17 153 CONG. REc. S13952 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2007) (relating to Food Energy Security Act
of 2007, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 12521 (engrossed Senate amendment, Dec. 14, 2007).
The introduction of the Senate amendment is at 153 CONG. REc. S 13774 (daily ed. Nov. 5,
2007).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 66, No. 3
586
THE RELEVANCE GAMES
penalty, it is important to formalize this process and move it to a higher
level of review.
Getting the Chief Counsel's Office involved earlier in this controversy will
help taxpayers and the IRS resolve or make litigation decisions regarding
tax shelters Parlier."'
The proposed bill retained the court-relevance determination in the intro-
ductory language of the main Code provision but added relevance language
to the penalty Code section:
The Chief Counsel ... may assert, compromise, or collect a penalty imposed
by this section with respect to a noneconomic substance transaction even if
there has not been a court determination that the economic substance doc-
trine was relevant . . . to the transaction if the Chief Counsel (or delegate)
determines that either was so relevant.'76
This provision makes a distinction between preliminary relevance (to be
determined by an administrative official) and ultimate relevance (to be deter-
mined by a court). The subsequent sentence in this penalty provision shows
a conscious understanding that the use of court-determined relevance in the
introductory language of the main statutory language is at odds with the
need for the tax agencies to use the doctrine in the examination process. This
sentence provides, "If there is a final order of a court that determines that the
economic substance doctrine was not relevant for purposes of this title to a
transaction (or series of transactions), any penalty imposed under this section
with respect to the transaction (or series of transactions) shall be rescinded." 7 7
While there is no indication in the committee reports that the simultane-
ous move to a new version of the introductory language and the addition of
the relevance provision were spurred by the problem exposed in the discus-
sion relating to Senator Grassley's proposed version of the penalty provision,
the timing is somewhat suggestive.17 1 That is, Senator Grassley's penalty rel-
evance provision highlighted that a relevance determination by a court in the
introductory provision was logically problematic given the need of the tax
agencies to raise the doctrine in audits or in refund suits. The codified rel-
evance provision sidesteps the problem by indicating that relevance is deter-
mined "in the same manner" as before. 1 Under the common law at the time
"'153 CONG. REc. S13952 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2007).
'
76See, e.g., Food and Energy Security Act of 2007, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 12522
(engrossed Senate amendment, Dec. 14, 2007). This provision appears in eight bills. Although
the introductory language in these bills contains the court determination of relevance provi-
sion, these eight bills did contain a change to the subjective inquiry, moving to the "substantial
purpose" phrase used in the enacted language.
'
77 See, e.g., H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 12522 (engrossed Senate amendment, Dec. 14,
2007).
"'
7 See supra note 60 and accompanying text for research methodology.
'
79See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
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of enactment, preliminary relevance was being determined primarily by the
tax agencies, with courts making ultimate relevance decisions."
b. The Role of Courts. The legislative history emphasizes court flex-
ibility, but it stops short of containing an unambiguous statement that courts
have discretion over ultimate relevance."8 ' That courts have such discretion is
instead inferred from an emphasis on court flexibility and from the multiple
indications that the codified doctrine is to develop on a common-law-like
path.'82 In addition to the material on the common law standard already
discussed above,183 the JCT Report and 2009 Ways and Means Report fur-
ther indicate that codification "does not alter the court's ability to aggregate,
disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the
doctrine."' Both reports explain, "the provision reiterates the present-law
ability of the courts to bifurcate a transaction in which independent activities
with non-tax objectives are combined with an unrelated item having only
tax-avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated benefits."'
Multiple earlier committee reports contain similar language, whether the
related bill lacked a specific provision on series of transactions or instead
wrapped series language into another provision, such as the introductory pro-
vision.' The JCT Report, in connection with the foreign taxes provision
discussed above, also contains a footnote providing that "[t]here is no inten-
tion to restrict the ability of the courts to consider the appropriate treatment
of foreign taxes in particular cases, as under present law.""
c. The Role ofTaxAgencies. The tax agencies figure more prominently
in individual statements than in the committee reports. The main reference
to a tax agency in a committee report was already quoted in the context
of discussing uniformity goals: "The Congress recognizes that the IRS has
achieved a number of recent successes in litigation. The Congress believes it
is still desirable to provide greater clarity and uniformity in the application
of the economic substance doctrine in order to improve its effectiveness at
"'See supra Part III.C.2.
"' See generally JCT REP., supra note 67; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2 (2009) (explaining
that the courts have flexibility, but not complete discretion, in determining relevance).
'
82Seesupra note 155.
'"See supra Part III.C.1.
'
84JCT REP., supra note 67, at 379; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 292 (2009).
'"JCT REP., supra note 67, at 379-80; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 292 (2009). These
sentences also support the solar panel credit example discussed supra Part III.B.5.
'
6S. REP. No. 110-206, at 93 (2007) (S. Comm. on Finance) (same as JCT Report); see
also S. REP. No. 109-336, at 139 (2006) (S. Comm. on Finance) ("[Tlhe provision does not
alter the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when
applying the doctrine."); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 223 (2006) (Conf Rep.) (same); H.R.
REP. No. 108-755, at 666 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (same); S REP. No. 108-192, at 86 (2003) (S.
Comm. on Finance) (same); H.R. REP. No. 108-126, at 46 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (same); S.
RaP. No. 108-11, at 79 (2003) (S. Comm. on Finance).
11 7JCT REP., supra note 67, at 381 n.1047. This note does not appear in the JCT Technical
Explanation.
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deterring unintended consequences."' 8 Though ambiguous as to the refer-
ent, the "its" in the second sentence appears to refer to the "doctrine" rather
than to the "IRS" in the preceding statement, but the overall indication is
one in which the Service is to continue pursuing the same types of transac-
tions as before.
Consideration of individual comments by legislators turns up a couple
of statements suggestive of the need of the doctrine in tax agency audits or
in litigation. Senator Graham of Florida commented in support of one bill:
"While disclosure of these schemes by taxpayers and promoters can be useful
in combating the proliferation of tax shelters, the IRS also needs some addi-
tional tools [referring to enactment of ESD]."'8 9 Senator Levin, as a cospon-
sor of a bill containing the economic substance doctrine, observed, "Abusive
tax shelters are usually tough to prosecute . ... Abusive tax shelters .. . are
often 'MEGOs,' meaning 'My Eyes Glaze Over.' Those who cook up these
concoctions count on their complexity to escape scrutiny and public ire."'"9
The overall context suggested that Senator Levin was discussing civil as well
as criminal prosecution of tax shelters.
Concern over the potential aggressiveness of the tax agencies is easier to
discern. Such concern is implied in two strands already discussed: the pro-
posal for a relevance provision in the penalty statute and the statements of
reassurance as to basic tax incentives and transactions. In addition, legislators
opposed to the doctrine emphasized the power of the Service. Senator Hatch
observed:
While I am certainly not in favor of abusive tax shelters, I am concerned
that part of this package of antitax shelter provisions, known as the clarifica-
tion of the economic substance doctrine, could also close down legitimate
tax planning techniques and give the Internal Revenue Service an unprec-
edented degree of authority to recast the tax treatment of transactions it
does not like, regardless of whether the transactions are otherwise allowed
under the tax law."'
'
8 JCT REP., supra note 67, at 378; H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 290 (2009). These
sentences do not appear in the JCT Technical Explanation.
189149 CONG. REc. S4930 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Bob Graham) (relat-
ing to CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. (2003)).
190153 CONG. REc. S2204-05 (2007) (relating to Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 11 Oth
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). Senator Levin repeated these comments in 2009.
CONG. REc. S2624-01 (2009) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (relating to Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. (2009)).
191149 CONG. REc. S5008-01 (2003) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (relating to CARE
Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. (2003)). Senator Hatch made a similar statement in 2004,
saying that he was pleased the economic substance doctrine was not enacted as it "would
have led to a great deal of unnecessary conflicts between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue
Service, and would have unfairly penalized companies for engaging in legitimate tax planning
techniques." 150 CONG. REc. S10967-01 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (relating to
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004)).
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Representative Poe, in the midst of the health care debates, argued that
"[t]he new health care bill also makes other legal tax deductions now illegal.
This new tax is called the economic substance doctrine . .. [T]he IRS would
be able to decide what a person was thinking when they bought something."19 2
This latter remark is not consistent with the legislative history of the doctrine,
nor does it reflect how the subjective inquiry works, but it is consistent with
the view that the tax agencies would have primary oversight of the decision to
test a transaction under the economic substance doctrine.
3. Chevron-Deference Regulations Available for Doctrine Requirements, Not
Specific Transactions
The JCT Report provided, "As with other provisions in the Code, the Sec-
retary has general authority to prescribe rules and regulations necessary for
the enforcement of the provision," and cited in support of this sentence sec-
tion 7805(a), which contains the general authority provision.'" The Supreme
Court case confirming that regulations issued under this provision should be
analyzed under the Chevron framework was decided after codification of the
doctrine but before the JCT Report was issued.'9' All bills since April 2003,
including the version of the Healthcare Reconciliation Act originally reported
in the House, contained some version of a specific regulatory authority provi-
sion.'9" The most common version, appearing in 59 bills, stated, "The Secre-
tary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry
out the purposes of this subsection. Such regulations may include exemptions
from the application of this subsection."' 9 6 The originally reported Health-
192155 CONG. REc. H12429-07 (2009) (statement of Rep. Ted Poe). Postcodification,
the economic substance doctrine has been raised in arguments against adding more specific
tax reforms. For example, Senator Kyl remarked, "Furthermore, Congress just gave the IRS
another anti-abuse tool when it codified the economic substance doctrine as part of the health-
care bill." 156 CONG. REc. S5412-01 (2010) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). Senator Enzi stated
in opposition to reforms relating to the self-employment tax and S corporations, "Plus, Con-
gress has codified the economic substance doctrine which says a transaction must have an
economic purpose aside from the reduction of tax liability in order to be considered valid.
In my opinion, this is the IRS's ace-in-the-hole card. The IRS can close any loophole-real or
imagined-with the power of the new law." 156 CONG. REc. S5240-03 (2010) (statement of
Sen. Mike Enzi).
'
93JCT REP., supra note 67, at 381 n.1048; see also Lederman, supra note 15, at 655-59
(discussing Code section 7805(a)); Merrill and Watts, supra note 15, at 570-75.
'"^Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). Codi-
fication occurred in March 2010; the JCT Report (General Explanation) was issued in March
2011. The JCT Technical Explanation was issued in March 2010. See supra Part III.A.2. For a
brief discussion of Chevron, see infra Part IVB.
'"Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 452 (as reported in House, Mar.
17, 2010). See supra note 60 for the research strategy employed to assemble bills addressing
the economic substance doctrine.
196See, e.g., Taxpayer and Fairness Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1661, 108th Cong. § 111
(as introduced in House, Apr. 8, 2003); Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of
2010, H.R. 3018, 111th Cong. § 411 (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 23, 2010).
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care Reconciliation Act contained a version that had the first sentence but
not the second.1 9 7 It is difficult to know what to make of the removal of the
specific regulatory provision in the final versions of the Healthcare Reconcili-
ation Act.'98 The committee reports for prior bills did not comment on the
regulatory authority but instead merely reproduced the regulations provision
without comment.199
As discussed above, the codified version does direct the Secretary to pro-
mulgate regulations requiring that foreign taxes be included in the pretax
profit calculation.200 A similar foreign taxes regulations statement is found in
only one other bill before codification, and it provided: "The Secretary may
issue regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in deter-
mining pretax profit in appropriate cases."201 Multiple unenacted bills also
contained a specific mention of regulations in the context of developing a
special profit calculation for lessors,202 but those bills contained both the spe-
cific provision and the more general statement about regulatory authority.203
It might be tempting to see the removal of the general provision and the
addition of the specific foreign taxes provision as imposing a restriction on
the issuance of general regulations claiming strong deference. 204 If one takes
the "never been enacted" language to a literal extreme, it also provides some
support for this view as, prior to codification, regulations touching on eco-
nomic substance would not have had a specific statute to interpret. 205 At the
same time, using the language contained in the relevance provision to make
inapplicable a Code section as well entrenched as section 7805(a) would be
'
97 Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 452 (as reported in House, Mar.
17, 2010).
'
9 8Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409,
124 Stat. 1029. Oddly, one postcodification bill contained a version of the economic substance
doctrine containing the language on regulations. American Business Competitiveness Act of
2010, H.R. 5962, 111th Cong. § 501 (as introduced in House, July 29, 2010) (this version
also did not have the foreign taxes regulation provision).
1
"See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 111-299, pt. 2, at 55, 293 (2009).
200Seesupra notes 123-31 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the effects on taxpay-
ers of statutory directions regarding regulations in the absence of promulgated regulations,
see Amandeep S. Grewal, Substance Over Form? Phantom Regulations and the Internal Revenue
Code, 7 Hous. Bus. &TAX L.J. 42 (2006).
20 1American Workers, State, and Business Relief Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong.
§ 421 (engrossed Senate amendment, Mar. 10, 2010; introduced, Dec. 7, 2009; sponsors and
cosponsors, Dec. 7, 2009).
202See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
203See, e.g., Telephone Excise Tax Repeal Act of 2005, S. 1321, 109th Cong. § 801 (as
reported in Senate, June 28, 2005).
204See e.g., id.
205 See supra note 39; infra notes 286-90 (discussing authorities issued under other Code
sections regarding abusive transactions).
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odd, to say the least.206 In addition, courts generally assume structural coher-
ence across the Code.207
4. Consequences ofRequirement That Codified Doctrine Evolve Like
Common Law
The legislative history supports that the "in the same manner" language
of the relevance provision refers to a common-law-like, gradual evolution of
the codified version. The specific references to "rules" and "standards" taps
directly into scholarship regarding these concepts. 208 A rule generally indi-
cates a law that is more knowable ex ante; a standard gains content gradually
through the accumulation of individual decisions. As a result, standards gen-
erate greater initial uncertainty but more flexibility. 209
The fact of codification triggered the general authority granted in the Code
to the tax agencies to issue interpretive regulations. 21 0 This raises the ques-
tion of the extent to which the tax agencies can specify the content of the
economic substance doctrine in advance of a court ruling while still adhering
to the statutory requirement of common-law-like expansions of the doctrine.
The three basic interpretive choices would be, first, to argue that the relevance
provision repealed that authority with respect to all but the foreign taxes pro-
vision of the economic substance doctrine. Second, the relevance provision
could be read as providing no constraint at all on the issuance of interpre-
tive regulations. The third course, which is the one proposed in this Article,
is that the general interpretive authority largely applies to the doctrine, but
that there is a line of specificity that tax agencies cannot cross and still expect
strong deference. 2 11 This approach reconciles the text and the history. It also
offers a fairly narrow constraint and preserves the "smell" test quality of the
common law doctrine. The boundaries of this reading of the relevance provi-
sion, as well as the placement of this argument within the discourse surround-
ing judicial deference, are explored in the next Part.
IV. The Service's Role
As discussed in Part II, prior to codification, the substance of the doctrine
was developing through a common law template-with the tax agencies'
enforcement choices obviously having some influence on the direction the
law was taking in the courts and with the tax agencies having a first mover
2
0See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 20, at 1269 ("The Justices invoke ... the canon dis-
favoring implied repeals somewhat more often in tax cases.").
2
'See id. at 1298-300 (discussing "whole code" approach of Supreme Court in tax cases).
208See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1995);
Gergen, supra note 46, at 143; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DuKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992).
209For a discussion of the nature and effect of uncertainty in the Code, see generally, Osof-
sky, supra note 47.
2 1 01I.R.C. § 7805(a).
21 See infa Part IVB (briefly discussing Chevron deference).
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advantage because of their ability to raise the issue during audits.212 This
Article argues that the relevance provision makes clear that the tax agencies'
general discretion in framing issues during audit and on litigation was not
directly expanded or contracted by the codified doctrine.2 13 In their exercise
of rulemaking authority, tax agencies are limited only inasmuch as the final
determination should remain within a court's discretion; thus, regulations
that tread too closely to deciding directly the fate of an individual transaction
are not entitled to strong deference under the proposed interpretation. 2 14
This Part begins with an overview of the postcodification activity of the
tax agencies; this activity is, so far, consistent with the interpretation of the
relevance provision proposed in this Article. Subpart B uses three hypotheti-
cal regulations to explore briefly the argument that the relevance provision
does pose some narrow constraints on the tax agencies' interpretive authority.
A. Actions So Far
The actions of the agencies to date are well within the bounds of the codi-
fied version. 2 15 Indeed, they reflect a consciousness on the part of the agencies
that codification cannot be taken lightly, particularly given the politics sur-
rounding tax reduction, avoidance, and shelters. The guidance has virtually
all been internal to the tax agencies, though available to the public. 216 As a
result, it can be said with high confidence that the material issued so far does
not contain the notice or other formal requirements necessary to be in the
212See supra Part I.
213For an overview of the general audit and litigation functions of the tax agencies, see
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 7.
214See supra Part .
215See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. But seeJ. Leigh Griffith, 40 Percent Strict
Liability Penalty: What Tax and Transaction Attorneys Need to Know, 48 TENN. BAR J. 18, 20
(2012) ("It appears the IRS will be aggressive.").
216Some further nuances of the tax agencies' approach might be gleaned from short verbal
comments made at various conferences or other events by particular individuals, but an analy-
sis of such offhand comments is not within the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder,
Alexander Addresses Determination ofEconomic Substance Doctrine, 127 TAx NOTES (TA) 1076
(June 7, 2010) (relating comments made by Service Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate)
William Alexander "during a webcast sponsored by the New York State Bar Association Tax
Section").
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running for strong deference.2 17 Indeed, "guidance" is arguably too strong a
word for the material issued to date, which, for the most part, does not pur-
port to be interpretive in form; rather, it consists primarily of statements of
internal policy regarding the audit and litigation functions of the tax agencies.
217This should be the result even given lingering confusion concerning the scope of Meadas
applied to tax guidance after Mayo. Mayo v. United States held that Chevron was the "appropri-
ate framework" for analyzing tax regulations issued pursuant to Code section 7805(a) follow-
ing notice and comment procedures. Mayo Found. for Educ. & Research v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011). United States v. Mead created uncertainty regarding the procedures
required to claim application of the Chevron framework. United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001). Regulations issued through notice and comment procedures should gener-
ally be eligible for the framework. Id. at 227-28. As to other types of procedures, the Court
commented, "we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such
administrative formality was required and none was afforded." Id. at 228. The Court in Mead
observed that not only must Congress have delegated authority, but the agency interpreta-
tion must be "promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Id. at 227. The internal agency
pronouncements discussed in this Part contain disclaimers expressing that they are not legally
binding. The public notice is framed as a request for comments and thus seems more likely to
be a first step in obtaining Chevron deference for future guidance. Mead itself held that tariff
classifications were only entitled to Skidmore power of persuasion deference. See Hickman,
supra note 15; Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search ofthe Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Lederman, supra note 15, at 665-68; Jim Rossi,
Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001).
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1. Public Pronouncements
Notice 2010-62 is to date the only significant economic substance doc-
trine guidance addressed to the public. 2 18 It was issued by the IRS Office of
Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration) on September 13,
2010 and was made retroactive to the date of the doctrine's enactment. 219
The Notice is brief and seems to have been issued primarily to comfort tax-
payers concerned that codification would trigger a more aggressive assertion
218Notice 2010-62, 2010-2 C.B. 411. Other, less significant items addressed to the public
have come in two varieties. The first type implements or clarifies portions of Notice 2010-62.
For example, Notice 2010-62 states that no private letter rulings will be issued as to the eco-
nomic substance doctrine. This was incorporated into the annual Revenue Procedure listing
areas that are "no ruling" areas beginning in 2012. Rev. Proc. 2012-3, 2012-1 C.B. 113; see aso
Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013 I.R.B. 113 (listing the doctrine again as a no ruling area for 2013).
In addition, a notice was issued streamlining the forms for the disclosure required by various
anti-tax-avoidance Code sections. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-2 C.B. 428.
The second type consists of content-free hints that more future guidance will be forthcom-
ing. Periodically, the Service and Treasury release a "priority guidance plan." This plan presents
a list of projects at the tax agencies. These include or are accompanied by notices in which the
tax agencies solicit "suggestions from all interested parties" in recognition of "the importance
of public input to formulate a Priority Guidance Plan that focuses resources on guidance items
that are most important to taxpayers and tax administration." Treasury, IRSAnnounce Release of
2010-11 Priority Guidance Plan, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 235-38 (Dec. 8, 2010); see also IRS,
Treasury Release 2011-2012 Priority Guidance Plan, 2011 TAx NOTES TODAY 172-53 (Sept. 6,
2011) (using virtually identical language). Beginning with the priority guidance plan issued
on December 7, 2010, the economic substance doctrine has been appearing under the "Tax
Administration" section. IRS, Treasury Release 2010-2011 Priority Guidance Plan, 2010 TAX
NOTES TODAY 235-25 (Dec. 8, 2010). The plans do not hint as to the form or content of the
future guidance, and generally just list "[g]uidance under section 7701(o) and 6662(b)(6)
regarding codification of the economic substance doctrine." IRS, Treasury Release 2012-2013
Priority Guidance Plan, 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 224-12 (Nov. 19, 2012); Updated 2011-
2012 Priority Guidance Plan Adds 9 Projects, 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 83-57 (Apr. 30, 2012);
Updated 2011-2012 Priority Guidance Plan Contains 14 New Items, 2012 TAx NOTES TODAY
17-18 (Jan. 26, 2012); Updated 2011-2012 Priority Guidance Plan Includes 3 Recently Pub-
lishedItems, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 212-40 (Nov. 2, 2011); IRS, Treasury Release 2011-2012
Priority Guidance Plan, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 172-53 (Sept. 6, 2011); IRS, Treasury Release
2010-2011 Priority Guidance Plan, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 235-25 (Dec. 8, 2010).
In the December 8, 2010, plan, Notice 2010-62 is listed as being the guidance for that
year. IRS, Treasury Release 2010-2011 Priority Guidance Plan, 2010 TAx NOTES TODAY 235-
25 (Dec. 8, 2010). In subsequent years, the Notice is listed as prior guidance. See, e.g., IRS,
Treasury Release 2012-2013 Priority Guidance Plan, 2012 TAx NOTES TODAY 224-12 (Nov.
19, 2012).
219 Notice 2010-62, 2010-2 C.B. 411 (providing "effective with respect to transactions
entered into on or after March 31, 2010").
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of the doctrine by the tax agencies.220 The Notice contains a one-paragraph
section titled, "Determination of Economic Substance Transactions," which
addresses the relevance provision. That paragraph, since it continues to rep-
resent the only direct statement on the relevance provision by a tax agency, is
quoted in full:
Section 7701(o)(5)(C) provides that the determination of whether a trans-
action is subject to the economic substance doctrine shall be made in the
same manner as if section 7701(o) had never been enacted. In addition, section
7701(o)(1) only applies in the case of any transaction to which the economic
substance doctrine is relevant. Consistent with these provisions, the IRS will
continue to analyze when the economic substance doctrine will apply in the
same fashion as it did prior to the enactment of section 7701(o). If authori-
ties, prior to the enactment of section 7701(o), provided that the economic
substance doctrine was not relevant to whether certain tax benefits are allow-
able, the IRS will continue to take the position that the economic substance
doctrine is not relevant to whether those tax benefits are allowable. The IRS
anticipates that the case law regarding the circumstances in which the eco-
nomic substance doctrine is relevant will continue to develop. Consistent
with section 7701(o)(5)(C), codification of the economic substance doctrine
should not affect the ongoing development of authorities on this issue. The
Treasury Department and the IRS do not intend to issue general adminis-
trative guidance regarding the types of transactions to which the economic
substance doctrine either applies or does not apply.221
This paragraph is a carefully worded exercise in making no statements that
could end up harming the government in the future. The paragraph does
not distinguish between preliminary testing under the economic substance
doctrine and final determinations that a transaction fails the doctrine, but the
overall impression is of an intention that transactions continue to be decided
in the courts.22 2 he final two sentences suggest that the Service and Treasury
22 0 hus, the Notice summarizes the law and contains multiple express and implicit promises
that the Service will not be attempting to undertake expansive renovations to the economic
substance doctrine arena or to introduce a new array of transactions to that arena's tests. For
example, "The IRS will continue to rely on relevant case law under the common-law economic
substance doctrine . . . . In performing this calculation [profit], the IRS will apply existing rel-
evant case law and other published guidance." Notice 2010-62, 2010-2 C.B. 411. The Notice
also contains rules regarding what will constitute "adequate disclosure" for purposes of the
penalty provision.
221Notice 2010-62, 2010-2 C.B. 411 (emphasis in original).
2 2 2See id. ("The IRS anticipates that the case law [on relevance] ... will continue to develop,"
and the Service does not intend to issue general guidance "regarding the types of transactions as
to which the economic substance doctrine either applies or does not apply.").
In addition to the paragraph about relevance, the Notice also provides, "The IRS will not
issue a private letter ruling or determination letter . . . regarding whether the economic sub-
stance doctrine is relevant to any transaction or whether any transaction complies with the
requirements of section 7701(o)." Id. The "or" is interesting in that it may suggest a distinc-
tion between testing a transaction and the more final decision that a transaction is or is not in
compliance.
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are reading the relevance provision as limiting their ability to issue overly
specific guidance regarding individual transactions, though the sentences also
leave plenty of room for the tax agencies to argue that they have not conceded
that point. While Notice 2010-62 is not all that illuminating regarding the
tax agencies' interpretation of the relevance provision, the Notice is clearly
not inconsistent with the interpretation of the relevance provision advanced
in this Article and provides some indirect support for it as well.
2. Internal Policies
Internal policy guidance provides a clearer sense of the tax agencies'
approach to the codified doctrine. The terms of these internal policies are
not inconsistent with the relevance provision interpreted here, but they also
reflect a quite cautious approach to the implementation of the doctrine.2 23
On July 15, 2011, the Commissioner of the Service's Large Business and
International Division issued a directive (LB&I directive) aimed at various
223Two recently released internal memoranda have been judged by practitioners as being
aggressive. See Amy S. Elliott, IRS Memo on Securities Lending Is Wrong, Practioners Say, 2013
TAX NOTES TODAY 25-3 (Feb. 6, 2013); Shamik Trivedi, No Surprises, Just Disappointment
with IRS Memo on Rehabilitation Credits, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 41-2 (Mar. 1, 2013). Nei-
ther memorandum addresses the codified doctrine, but as both were issued postcodification,
the approach taken in them will be (and already has been) closely scrutinized for signs about
the possible future intentions of the tax agencies. Neither memorandum addresses the 2011
LB&I directive discussed in the main text, presumably because the directive applied to imple-
menting the codified doctrine and the memoranda address transactions entered into prior to
codification.
The first was written by Associate Chief Counsel (International) to a Program Manager for
Large Business and International. It concluded that the economic substance doctrine could be
applied to securities lending transactions designed to completely eliminate withholding taxes.
Economic Substance Doctrine May Apply to Securities Lending Scheme, 2012 TAx NOTES TODAY
234-18 (Dec. 5, 2012). The memorandum emphasizes the transaction's lack of a nontax busi-
ness purpose in reaching its conclusion.
The second was addressed to a field attorney in Large Business and International by an
Associate Area Counsel. Historic Rehabilitation Partnership a Sham, IRS Concludes, 2013 TAX
NOTES TODAY 41-18 (March 1, 2013). It provides some sense of the possible direction agents
may take in discerning congressional intent. Like the securities lending memorandum, the
rehabilitation credit memorandum emphasized the presence of nontax business purpose. The
credit memorandum also indicated that claimed benefits must be supported by congressional
intent as to the structure used to obtain the benefits. The memorandum states, "it cannot be
said that the structure of this transaction-that is, the alleged partnership arrangement between
the [formal partner] and [the partnership]-is so 'unmistakably within the contemplation of
congressional intent,' . . . as to warrant departure from the normal application of the sham-
partnership doctrine." Id. Although the memorandum speaks in terms of a "sham-partnership
doctrine," it references economic substance cases. The rehabilitation memorandum's approach
is consistent with the legislative history regarding the application of the codified economic
substance doctrine when tax credits or similar benefits are at stake.
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directors over various categories of Service agents.224 Its stated purpose was "to
instruct examiners and their managers how to determine when it is appropri-
ate to seek the approval of the DFO [director of field operations] in order to
raise the economic substance doctrine."22 5 Thus, the LB&I directive is aimed
at providing guidance as to when applying the economic substance doctrine
would or would not likely be "appropriate" during audits.22 6 The directive
states, "Once an examiner determines that raising the doctrine may be appro-
priate, this directive sets forth a series of inquiries the examiner must develop
and analyze in order to seek approval for the ultimate application of the doc-
trine in the examination."2 2 7
The examination framework developed in the directive shows consider-
able restraint and concern for taxpayers. For example, it provides that the
examiner "shall notify a taxpayer that the examiner is considering whether to
apply the economic substance doctrine to a particular transaction as soon as
possible, but not later than when the examiner begins the analysis ... ."228 This
22 4IRS Issues LB& Directive on Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Penalties, 2011
TAX NOTES TODAY 137-17 (July 18, 2011). For a general discussion of the directive, see Robert
S. Chase II et al., Economic Substance Directive: Some Substance, Many Questions, 132 TAx
NOTES (TA) 828 (Aug. 22, 2011); David C. Garlock et al., Analysis ofthe LB&IDirective on the
Economic Substance Doctrine, 133 TAX NOTES (TA) 193 (Oct. 10, 2011); Richard M. Lipton,
IRS Provides Helpful Guidance to Agents as to Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine,
115 J. TAX. 116 (2011); Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Repeal of the Economic Substance Statute, 2012
TAX NOTES TODAY 34-1 (Feb. 21, 2012).
This major LB&I directive was preceded by a much shorter directive issued in September
of 2010 by the Commissioner of the Service's Large and Mid-Size Business Division, the pre-
decessor to LB&I (the LMSB directive). The LMSB directive was aimed at allaying concerns
among taxpayers and practitioners about the strict liability penalty, although the directive
expressly stated a warning: "This Directive is not an official pronouncement of law, and cannot
be used, cited, or relied upon as such." Economic Substance Doctrine Penalty Must Be Approved
by Field Director, LMSB Directive Says, 2010 TAx NOTES TODAY 178-47 (Sept. 15, 2010). The
directive's central guidance consists of a single sentence: "To ensure consistent administration
of the accuracy-related penalty imposed under section 6662(b)(6), any proposal to impose a
section 6662(b)(6) penalty at the examination level must be reviewed and approved by the
appropriate Director of Field Operations before the penalty is proposed." Id
The codified economic substance doctrine has also been added to at least one audit tech-
nique guide; such guides are issued to examiners and address a particular industry or topic. In
July 2011, the Service issued a revised guide for the "business consulting industry." IRS Releases
Business Consultants Audit Techniques Guide, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-39 (July 12, 2011).
The guide listed the doctrine but did not provide substantive guidance as to its content. In
addition to the economic substance doctrine, the guide also added related items: "the shifting
or assignment of income issue and the substance versus form issue." Id.
2251IRS Issues LBef Directive on Codfied Economic Substance Doctrine and Penalties, 2011
TAX NOTES TODAY 137-17 (July 18, 2011).
22 6 The directive uses the word "relevant" only when quoting from the statute. Id. The direc-
tive was specifically addressed to "industry directors director, field specialists director, pre-filing
and technical guidance director, international business compliance director, international indi-
vidual compliance." Id
227 d
228 Id.
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notice requirement is not, however, intended to provide additional taxpayer
rights. Indeed, the directive states that it "is not an official pronouncement
of law, and cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such." 229 The directive
is, however, also careful to make no absolute statements regarding when the
economic substance doctrine will or will not be raised in an audit.
The directive implements a four-step decision-making framework. Step 1
consists of a set of factors for use in evaluating "whether the circumstances in
the case are those under which application of the economic substance doc-
trine to a transaction is likely not appropriate." 230 Although weight is not
assigned to the factors, the Step 1 factors are divided into two categories. The
first category consists of 18 factors. Most of the factors are standard red flags
for abusive tax avoidance and require the examiner to look for the absence
of such items: for example, "Transaction is not promoted/developed/admin-
istered by tax department or outside advisors" and "Transaction does not
involve a tax-indifferent counter-party that recognizes substantial income." 231
Some of the factors restate portions of the codified statute and require the
examiner to look for their presence: for example, "Transaction has cred-
ible business purpose apart from federal tax benefits." 23 2 Evaluation is also
required of whether a "[t]ransaction that generates targeted tax incentives is,
in form and substance, consistent with Congressional intent in providing the
incentives." 233 This factor is in line with the first component of the relevance
provision interpretation advanced throughout this Article, though the LB&I
directive follows the JCT Report version and omits the adverb "clearly."234
The second category discussed in Step 1 consists of the four items listed
in both the JCT report and 2009 Ways and Means Report as "basic busi-
ness transactions" that the economic substance doctrine is "not intended
to alter."235 This mini-angel list is preceded by the warning that "it is likely
not appropriate to raise the economic substance doctrine if the transaction
being considered is related to the following circumstances." 23 6 Importantly,
this language creates only a presumption of inapplicability but does not cut
off all consideration of the doctrine even as to these items. Similarly, even
the absence of multiple problematic factors does not absolutely block further
scrutiny under the doctrine.23 '
229 jdj
230 d. Step 1 is integrally related to Step 2; indeed, they are, in substance, arguably a single
step. This Article describes the LB&I directive more formalistically in order to highlight the
slight differences between Step 1 and Step 2.
231 d
232 d233 Jd
234 Id.; JCT REP., supra note 67.
2 35See supra Part III.B.3.
236 Memorandum from Heather Maloy, supra note 222.
2 37
. ("If some of the factors ... apply to the transaction, and an examiner continues to
believe that the application of the doctrine is appropriate, the examiner should continue to
analyze the transaction using the guidance set forth in Steps 2-4.").
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This flexibility is consistent with the language in the history suggesting
that facts and circumstances could lead to a conclusion that basic business
components of a larger, extended tax avoidance scheme could still fail for
lack of economic substance.238 Thus, Step 1 stakes a claim for broad use of
discretion during the audit proceedings, a claim that is fully supported by
the relevance provision, as it is interpreted in this Article. At the same time,
the LB&I directive is not asserting that ordinary business transactions-if
truly ordinary-are subject to the doctrine. This is made clear by the words
of caution and by the supervisor involvement required at later steps.23 9 The
preservation of flexibility simply reflects an understanding that tomorrow's
tax shelter could be constructed using bits of basic business transactions.
Step 2 of the directive contains a list of facts and circumstances "tend[ing]
to show that the application of the economic substance doctrine may be
appropriate." 240 The difference in wording between Step 1 ("likely not appro-
priate") and Step 2 ("may be appropriate") is striking and operates again in
the direction of restraint. There is no Step 2 counterpart to the Step 1 second
set of basic business transaction factors-no demon list. Instead, the factors
are the inverse of the Step 1 factors. 241 The only factor not repeated in Step 2
is the one requiring an evaluation that the transaction "is, in form and sub-
stance, consistent with Congressional intent in providing the incentives."242
If an examiner emerges from Steps 1 and 2 with a belief "that the applica-
tion of the economic substance doctrine may be appropriate," Step 3 contains
a more pointed series of seven inquiries.243 In general, if the examiner answers
any of the seven questions in the affirmative, then the examiner must receive
approval from his or her manager before proceeding. 24 4 Three of the inquiries
look more deeply at whether the transaction is instead blessed by a specific
statute or group of statutes. 245 Again, this is consistent with the proposed
interpretation of the relevance provision. One question requires greater scru-
tiny into whether judicial or administrative "precedent" has permitted the
transaction (or one substantially similar) either by rejecting application of the
economic substance doctrine or by upholding it without mention of the doc-
2381d.2391d
240 Id
241For example, "Transaction is promoted/developed/administered by tax department or
outside advisors," "Transaction involves a tax-indifferent counter-party that recognizes sub-
stantial income," and "Transaction has no credible business purpose apart from federal tax
benefits." Id.
242See id.
243See id.
244 d
245The inquiries are as follows: (a) "Is the transaction a statutory or regulatory election?";
(b) "Is the transaction subject to a detailed statutory or regulatory scheme?"; and (c) "Does the
transaction involve tax credits (e.g., low income housing credit, alternative energy credits) that
are designed by Congress to encourage certain transactions that would not be undertaken but
for the credits?" Id.
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trine.2 46 Three final questions require consideration of whether some other
approach might be preferable-a general substance-over-form approach, for
example.2 47
After Step 3 is completed, Step 4 requires another round of supervisory
scrutiny. The examiner, "in consultation with his or her manager and ter-
ritory manager, should describe for the appropriate DFO [director, field
operations2 48] in writing how the analysis described in the guidance above
was completed."24 9 The director of field operations must not only review the
material but also consult with the Chief Counsel's office before a decision is
made.250 Then, if the director decides to go forward, he or she "shall provide
the taxpayer an opportunity to explain their position, either in writing or in
person (at the DFO's discretion), addressing whether the doctrine should
be applied to a particular transaction. Once the DFO has made a final deci-
sion, that decision should be conveyed to the examiner in writing." 251' The
opportunity for taxpayer input at this stage in the process again highlights
the Service's restraint in utilizing the codified doctrine, and it also reveals an
understanding of the political fallout that would arise if field agents began to
apply the doctrine indiscriminately.
The LB&I directive does not contain much guidance, however, about how
to find the boundaries of a "transaction." It provides:
[W]hen a transaction involves a series of interconnected steps with a com-
mon objective, the term 'transaction' refers to all of the steps taken together.
However, in certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to apply this guid-
246Id. ("Does precedent exist (judicial or administrative) that either rejects the application
of the economic substance doctrine to the type of transaction or a substantially similar transac-
tion or upholds the transaction and makes no reference to the doctrine when considering the
transaction?")
24 7These inquiries are as follows: (a) "Does another judicial doctrine (e.g., substance over
form or step transaction) more appropriately address the noncompliance that is being exam-
ined? . . . To determine whether another judicial doctrine is more appropriate to challenge a
transaction, an examiner should seek the advice of the examiner's manager in consultation
with local counsel"; (b) "Does recharacterizing a transaction (e.g., recharacterizing debt as
equity, recharacterizing someone as an agent of another, recharacterizing a partnership interest
as another kind of interest, or recharacterizing a collection of financial products as another
kind of interest) more appropriately address the noncompliance that is being examined? If so,
recharacterization should be applied and not the economic substance doctrine. To determine
whether recharacterization is more appropriate to challenge a transaction" seek management
advice; and (c) "In considering all the arguments available to challenge a claimed tax result,
is the application of the doctrine among the strongest arguments available? If not, then the
application of the doctrine should not be pursued without specific approval." Id
248See Large Business &International Organization Chart, IRS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.
irs.gov/publirs-utl/lbiorgchart.pdf.
249 IRS Issues LB& Directive on Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Penalties, 2011
TAx NOTEs TODAY 137-17 (July 18, 2011).250]d
251Id
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ance separately to one or more steps that are included within a series of
arguably interconnected steps. 25 2
If an examiner wants to divide a common transaction into smaller steps,
the examiner "is required to seek guidance from their manager and consult
with their local counsel before doing so."253
The LB&I directive was effectively extended to all Service field operations
through a notice issued on April 2, 2012, by the Service's Office of Chief
Counsel (Counsel Notice).254 The Counsel Notice also specified that the
LB&I framework governs when the Service provides advice to the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) in any tax litigation conducted by the DOJ. 255 The
Notice is aimed at national coordination and consistency in the way the Ser-
vice raises the economic substance doctrine on audit or litigation or through
administrative guidance. The Notice states that the procedures are to be fol-
lowed " [t]o ensure that the common law ... and the codified economic sub-
stance doctrine and related penalties are only raised in appropriate cases."256
The Notice expressly provides that it is not creating new taxpayer rights.257
As to the audit process, the Notice directs that Counsel should provide
assistance regarding the economic substance doctrine "upon request by the
Service during the ordinary course of an examination, including examina-
tions of claims for refund and administrative adjustment requests."258 The
content of any advice should "consider the factors" of the LB&I directives. 25 9
Coordination nationally is required as part of any Counsel review of a pro-
posed tax deficiency. The Counsel Notice imposes a higher procedural stan-
dard and national coordination before the doctrine is raised by the Service as
a "new issue" in Tax Court or in the advice it renders the DOJ as it conducts
tax litigation in the other federal courts. 260 Finally, the Counsel Notice pro-
2521d
253Id.
254C.C.N. 2012-008 (Apr. 3, 2012); see also I.R.C. § 7803(b) (describing duties of the Chief
Counsel, including to be legal advisor to the Commissioner).
255C.C.N. 2012-008 (Apr. 3, 2012).
256Id
257Id ("The procedures in this notice do not create any substantive or procedural rights
for taxpayers, and the failure to follow any of these procedures in whole, or in part, does not
invalidate any otherwise valid notice of deficiency or other Service action.").
258Id. For an overview of the audit process, including internal appeals, see RICHARDSON ET
AL., supra note 7, at 93-134.
259 The Notice also requires that if a favorable private letter ruling exists as to the transaction
being tested, then the letter ruling must be revoked prior to adjustment under the doctrine,
even if the private letter ruling did not address the economic substance doctrine. A letter rul-
ing is binding as to the parties to the ruling, but only to the extent the facts are as provided by
the taxpayer in the ruling request and subject to the potential future revocation of the ruling.
Although redacted private letter rulings are publicly available, they are not to be relied upon by
anyone but the party to the ruling. See RiCHARDSON ET AL., supra note 7.
260As was the case with the examination-related guidance, if an action is supported by favor-
able private letter rulings or determination letters, those must be revoked before the doctrine
is raised as a new issue. C.C.N. 2012-008 (Apr. 3, 2012).
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vides that administrative pronouncements are to be consistent with the stat-
ute and previous guidance, including the LB&I directive.
3. The Tax Agencies' Compliance
The actions of the Treasury and the Service to date are fully consistent with
the text, purpose, and history of the doctrine. If anything, they err on the side
of caution.261 The Service has substantial discretion and powers in conducting
audits and litigation.262 As argued above, the relevance provision does not so
much add an additional constraint on these functions as suggest a course for
prudential use of the doctrine. Because of the doctrine's association with the
highly politicized health care legislation, circumspection may be especially
critical. With the passage of time, or with the emergence of new styles of abu-
sive transactions, the Treasury and the Service may shift course and provide
interpretive guidance on the doctrine and on the relevance provision.
B. Narrow Constraint on Administrative Interpretation
The preceding Subpart suggested that the relevance provision has little
direct impact on the tax agencies so long as the tax agencies continue on their
present course of avoiding the issuance of regulations. This Subpart considers
the effects should the Treasury and the Service change their policy and issue
regulations purportedly entitled to strong judicial deference.263 This Subpart
outlines the path to obtaining such deference. This Subpart then consid-
ers how three hypothetical regulation types would fare. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the hypothetical regulations meet formal, procedural criteria for
261Lee Sheppard has argued that the LB&I directive is so considerate of taxpayers that it
amounts to a repeal of the statute. Sheppard, supra note 224, at 76.
262 1t is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss more fully the audit and litigation func-
tions except to say that they are broad. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 20, at 1297 (discuss-
ing tax-specific canon "favoring broad tax coverage or broad IRS authority").
Multiple procedural limits, of course, apply to those functions. The contours of more equi-
table constraints-such as a duty of consistency-are less clear. See Steve R. Johnson, An IRS
Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution,
77 TENN. L. REv. 563, 566-67 (2010); Christopher Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal Revenue
Service Have A Duty to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. 531,
535 (2005); Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to Be Consis-
tent?, 40 TAx L. REV. 411, 417 (1985).
263Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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obtaining strong deference2 64 and that they are not issued during the course of
litigation or in response to a court decision. 265
1. Ambiguity, Reasonableness, and the Relevance Provision
The Supreme Court's Chevron decision provides what seems a straightfor-
ward formula for determining whether an agency's interpretation of a statute
should receive strong judicial deference.266 The vast case law and scholarship
on the Chevron two-step have shown, however, that the formula is far from
easy to apply.267 A detailed discussion of Chevron's nuances and complexities is
beyond the scope of this Article. In general, however, under the formulation
of Chevron, the first step requires a determination that the statute contains a
gap that the agency issuing the regulation has the authority to fill. 268 Ambigu-
ity in the text is generally presumed to indicate the existence of such a gap,
but there is no clear guidance as to how to determine whether a delegat-
ing ambiguity exists.269 If it is decided that the statute delegates gap-filling
authority, the second Chevron step requires deference to the agency's interpre-
tation so long as it is reasonable. 270
Ambiguity and reasonableness are somewhat malleable in that a judge's
underlying approach to statutory interpretation may strongly influence the
2
64Seesupra note 219 (discussing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Mayo
Found. for Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011)); see also In re
Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.2d 605, 619-20 (6th Cir. 2012) (giving no Chevron deference for
revenue ruling); In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d
138, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (prospectively vacating Notice 2006-50 because of failure to meet
notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act).
265See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1838 (2012); Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 981-82 (2005); see also
Lederman, supra note 15 at 673-74; Gregg Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?,
84 B.U. L. REv. 185, 204 (2004).
266 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
267See authorities cited supra note 15.
268 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority.").
269Id at 844 ("Sometimes the legislative delegation ... is implicit."); see also United States
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2012).
270 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statu-
tory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the ... agency.").
In the main text, "reasonableness" indicates substantive reasonableness (i.e., reasonable inter-
pretation of statute). Reasonableness may also incorporate a requirement that the interpreta-
tion be accompanied by explanations demonstrating that the position was arrived at through
reasoned decision making. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n of United States, Inc., v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). For discussion of State Farm and its relation to
Chevron step two, see Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011); Lisa Schultz Bress-
man, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DuKE L.J. 549, 585-86 (2009); Aprill, supra note 22, at 2118-21;
Patrick J. Smith, The APA Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and IRS Regulations, 2012 TAx
NOTEs TODAY 137-4 (July 17, 2012); Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"-The Courts
in Administrative Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 826 (2008). This Article will address only
substantive reasonableness and assume that the agencies have engaged in "reasoned decision
making" and have provided an adequate explanation of the same.
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outcome. The Supreme Court in Chevron directed, "If a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law,"27' and
"legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless . . . manifestly con-
trary to the statute."2 72 Statutory interpretation thus may play a role at both
steps. While as a practical matter most judges will look at legislative history
(particularly in tax cases), as has been already noted in this Article, some
judges are deeply averse to any use of legislative history.2 73
In the case of future economic substance regulations, a judge willing to
consider fully the legislative history discussed above may conclude that Con-
gress left some interpretive gaps for agencies to fill but that this authority was
limited by an intention that the agencies not interpret their way into deciding
individual transactions in place of courts. As a result, such a judge may be
more inclined to find no reason to move to the second Chevron step given a
regulation that overstepped the gap.
A judge unwilling to look to legislative history might decide that the rel-
evance provision is ambiguous, that ambiguity equals delegation, and quickly
move to the second Chevron step.2 74 On the other hand, a textualist judge
may also be more ready to assert that the relevance provision is not ambigu-
ous.275 A textualist judge might, for example, start with the view that the plain
meaning of the "never been enacted phrase" is that no economic substance
71 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
272Id. at 844; see also Mashaw, supra note 20, at 830-31 (discussing "traditional tools" in
terms of textualist influence on the use of legislative history).
273See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 20, at 1254, 1291 ("The Court in tax law decisions
relies significantly more on both legislative history and language canons-and somewhat more
on substantive canons-than it does in labor and employment cases"; but "Justice Scalia has
adopted this implacable stance [against using legislative history] in tax law cases as well.").
The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Home Concrete & Supply highlighted the
divide between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia on this issue. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at
1836. The case addressed whether a Supreme Court's prior opinion interpreting a tax statute of
limitation precluded the Treasury's conflicting interpretation. Id. at 1838. Justice Breyer, writ-
ing for a plurality of justices, explained that the prior Supreme Court opinion, which included
an "examination of legislative history," had already determined that Congress had clearly spo-
ken on the issue. Id. at 1844. As a result, no gap-filling delegation existed that the regulation
could fill. Id. Justice Scalia concurred in the result because of "justifiable taxpayer reliance,"
but he took the plurality to task, emphasizing that "Post-Chevron cases do not 'conclude' that
Congress wanted the particular ambiguity resolved by the agency; that is simply the legal efect
of ambiguity-a legal effect that should obtain whenever the language is in fact . . . ambigu-
ous." Id. at 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Sunstein, supra note 15 (discussing division
between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia).
274See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Ambiguity means Congress intended agency discretion. Any resolution of the ambiguity by
the administering agency that is authoritative ... must be accepted ... if it is reasonable.").
27 5See Scalia, supra note 15, at 521 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning
of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less
often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.").
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regulations (other than on foreign taxes)27 6 are candidates for strong deference
because, prior to enactment, there was no statutory provision to interpret.
As already discussed above, however, this reading is at odds with the general
grant of interpretive authority contained in section 7805(a).2 77 To interpret
the relevance provision as a blanket restriction on regulations, a judge would
further have to conclude that the "never been enacted" language is specific
enough to repeal section 7805(a) as to the economic substance doctrine. 278
Yet an alternative reading of the text could suggest the opposite conclu-
sion-that there is no ambiguity as to regulatory authority because that is not
what the provision is about.279 The dictionary meanings of the term "relevant"
refer more to preliminary connections between the doctrine and a transac-
tion than to ultimate resolution of the decision; thus, the relevance provision
could also be read as meaning simply that tax agencies are to continue test-
ing transactions using the same basic criteria they did before enactment. 28 0
That the text potentially supports multiple "plain" readings suggests that it is
ambiguous.
As with a determination of ambiguity, the extent to which legislative
history may be used to establish the reasonableness of an interpretation is
unsettled.28 1 In any event, with respect to many potential, future economic
substance doctrine regulations, the legislative history would provide only con-
firmation of an outcome rather than change the outcome.282 For example, if
the agency issued regulations providing that specific tax credits automatically
failed the subjective inquiry of the economic substance doctrine, it would not
take a judge willing to look at legislative history to determine that this would
2 76 See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
I77 1.R.C. § 7805(a).
278See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 133, at 279 ("[W]hen exception by implication is
asserted, the implication must be clear enough to overcome the presumption against implied
repeal.").
2 79A third possibility is that a judge could decide that the issue of final relevance is purely
factual and thus not open to agency interpretation. See supra note 136 (discussing standard of
review problem); see also infa text accompanying notes 294-97 (discussing facts of Mayo). The
proximity of tax avoidance to tax crimes may also have an effect pointing toward reservation
of discretion to the courts. See Dan Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
HARv. L. REv. 469 (1996).
28
0See supra text accompanying note 164.
281See supra text accompanying note 20.
282 See ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 20.
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be an unreasonable interpretation of the doctrine's scope.283 The next Subpart
suggests hypothetical regulations as to which the legislative history might be
more essential to a determination of reasonableness.
2. Hypothetical Regulations
The hypothetical regulations discussed below are intended to draw atten-
tion to a narrow constraint the legislative history suggests as to the tax agen-
cies' ability to promulgate Chevron deference-earning regulations. The limit
should only be as strong as is required to ensure that the codified economic
substance doctrine develops "in the same manner" as the common law. This
Article argues that the relevance provision only prevents the tax agencies from
obtaining Chevron deference for regulations that have the effect of directly
deciding ex ante that a specific transaction fails the doctrine. Regulations that
define ambiguous terms and that have an indirect effect on a transaction's
ability to survive the economic substance doctrine would be entitled to Chev-
ron deference (assuming procedural requirements to obtaining such deference
are followed). Of course, nothing prevents the tax agencies from specifying
in advance that particular transactions lack economic substance; as to such
pronouncements, however, judicial deference should turn on the persuasive-
ness of the tax agencies' position.
a. Neither Angels Nor Demons. Immediately following codification,
several practitioners requested that the tax agencies issue "angel" lists-lists
of transactions that the agencies would not attack for lack of economic sub-
stance.284 The tax agencies have, so far, refused to do so. 285 Because taxpayers
would be unlikely to challenge "angel" list regulations, this section considers
the results if the tax agencies were to issue "demon" list regulations. The same
2 83 The legislative history would also be of little help as to hypothetical regulations in which
the agencies set out the scope of their own authority. For example, assume the agencies issue
regulations that interpret the relevance provision as a blanket restriction on the agencies' abil-
ity to issue further regulations. Or, alternatively, they promulgate regulations providing that
the relevance provision offers no constraints on the agencies' usual interpretive authority. Such
regulations, while interesting to contemplate, do not offer testable interpretations of the stat-
ute. As to the first possibility, it is unlikely that any taxpayer would want to challenge a "no
regulation" regulation, but there is also no clear path for challenging such an interpretation,
given the general requirement in tax law of an actual deficiency or refund claim before tax law
may be challenged. See I.R.C. § 7421 (known as 'Anti-Injunction Act"); Nat'l Fed'n Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582-84 (2012) (decision regarding health care mandate not
barred by Anti-Injunction Act). Similarly, an "all-regulations-permitted" regulation does not
become meaningful except in the event additional regulations actually are issued and applied
in a specific controversy. The test of the more specific regulation would provide the context and
means for testing the more general assertion of authority.
2
84See McMahon Jr., supra note 26.
. See, e.g., George G. Jones & Mark A. Luscombe, Tax Strategy: Codification of economic
substance: Ready or not, ACCOUNTING TODAY (May 24, 2010), http://www.accountingtoday.
com/ato issues/24_6/tax-strategy-codification-of-economic-substance-ready-or-not-54210-1.
html.
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analysis would apply if courts were instead considering whether to accord
strong deference to a regulatory list of angelic transactions.
Creating such regulations would be a relatively easy matter. The Code
already contains disclosure requirements for "reportable transactions" and
grants specific authority to the tax agencies to identify which transactions
are reportable.28 6 Under the Code, a reportable transaction is one that the
tax agencies determine has "a potential for tax avoidance or evasion."287 A
subcategory of reportable transactions known as "listed transactions" has a
higher associated penalty for disclosure failures.288 "Listed transactions" are
those which the tax agencies identify "as a tax avoidance transaction."289 The
tax agencies have issued multiple "listed transaction" notices.290 Regulations
issued under the codified economic substance doctrine could use listed trans-
action notices to build "demon" lists.29'
This Article argues that the relevance provision should prevent such a regu-
lation from being reasonable for purposes of gaining Chevron deference. That
a transaction is also a listed transaction may well persuade a court that it fails
economic substance,292 but under the proposed interpretation of the relevance
provision, the court should retain the judgment call as to whether the transac-
tion ultimately fails the economic substance doctrine. A useful contrast may
be drawn through consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States.293 At issue was
whether a regulation deliberately defining "student" so as to exclude medical
residents should be given strong deference.294 In a unanimous, eight-justice
decision,295 the Court held that the statute's term, "student," was ambigu-
ous and that the regulation (issued pursuant to section 7805(a)) was owed
286 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
287I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(1).
281I.R.C. § 6707A(b).
2 89 I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(2).
290 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
291 This Subpart is assuming that proper formalities are observed. See supra note 219 (dis-
cussing Mead and Mayo). A regulation simply specifying that any listed transaction entered
into after the effective date of the codified economic substance doctrine automatically fails the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, including the opportunity for
notice and comment as to both the listed transactions notice and the economic substance regu-
lation. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.2d 605, 619-20 (6th Cir. 2012) (no deference for
position that supplemental unemployment benefits constituted wages for purposes of FICA
because no promulgated regulations). With thanks to Kristin Hickman for this observation.
292See supra note 219 (listing articles discussing Skidmore deference).
293 Compare Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704
(2011), with In re Quality Stores, 693 F.2d at 619-20 (holding that the position that supple-
mental unemployment benefits constituted wages for purposes of FICA does not deserve def-
erence because the regulations were not promulgated).
294Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 709-10. The rule was amended in December 2004 and made it clear
that medical residents could not rely on a student exception to collection of the Social Security
tax. Id. at 709.
2951d. at 708 (8-0 decision; Justice Kagan did not participate).
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Chevron deference as a reasonable interpretation of the term.2 96 As a result,
the legal question of whether a medical resident is a student has been settled;
future litigation will be about facts-whether someone is a medical resident.
This Article argues that attempts to define terms such as "relevant" or "trans-
action" in a way that would directly remove the ultimate relevance decision
from a court's discretion would be unreasonable interpretations of the statute.
The legislative history support for this limit was discussed in Part III (of
course, a judge willing to use that history may have been convinced that the
decision regarding ultimate relevance had not been delegated in any case.) 297
The case for a textualist judge reaching the conclusion that "demon" lists
are unreasonable is less robust. If such a judge is willing to see ambiguity,
the same judge is also likely to be more willing to defer to regulations. One
potential path would require recognition of a conflict between the "never
been enacted" language and section 7805(a)'s general delegation of inter-
pretive authority.298 If such a conflict were recognized, 2 99 a textualist judge
might then reconcile the provisions by determining that courts retain discre-
tion over ultimate relevance.300 A textualist judge might also reason that the
reportable transaction provisions indicate that Congress knows how to grant
authority for specific listmaking activities, yet Congress did not provide such
authority in the case of the economic substance doctrine.301 Willingness to
look at legislative history could, however, prove crucial to the outcome of this
hypothetical given the high bar required for a determination that a regulation
is unreasonable.
b. Seeing Red. The second hypothetical regulation is derived from
internal guidance that has already been issued. As was discussed above, inter-
nal guidance requires field agents to review a listing of multiple factors when
deciding whether to pursue an economic substance doctrine analysis. 302 Now
consider hypothetical regulations listing red flags and specifying that if a
transaction exhibits three or more of the red flags, then the transaction auto-
296Id at 711, 714.
297 See supra Part IV.B. 1.
298 See supra Part I.B. 1.
299 See supra Part IV.B. 1 (discussing possible reading that viewed relevance provision as being
only about preliminary and not final relevance). Another possibility that would lead to the
same outcome-no strong deference for "demon" list regulations-would be if a textualist
judge determined that the issue of ultimate relevance was a purely factual determination not
amenable to interpretive regulations in the first place. See supra note 136 (discussing standard
of review issue).
300See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 133, at 180 ("The provisions of a text should be inter-
preted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.").
3 1 See supra notes 39, 286-90 and accompanying text discussing a "reportable" transactions
regime.
3
o
2See discussion supra note 230.
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matically fails the economic substance doctrine.3 03 As with the hypothetical
list of "demons," this type of regulation removes the final legal determination
from the court; under the proposed interpretation of the relevance provision,
such regulations should not be considered reasonable. The reasoning is the
same as that applied to the "demon" list regulations, but such a "red flag" reg-
ulation would present an even closer case because a red flag regulation would
be generally applicable across transactions rather than narrowly tailored to
strike down a specific transaction.
If, alternatively, a red flag regulation were altered so it contained room for
judicial discretion, then such a regulation-if properly issued-should be
entitled to strong deference. For example, a provision could be added speci-
fying that any resulting failure of the economic substance doctrine could be
rebutted by a showing that the transaction as structured is clearly consistent
with congressionally intended tax benefits. Chevron deference would be avail-
able in such a case.
c. So Happy Together. The final hypothetical regulation brings
back the solar panel credit hypothetical discussed above and used to high-
light the importance of specifying the "transaction."3 04 As David Hariton has
explained, how the "transaction" is framed can be outcome determinative.30 5
Assume that the tax agencies issue regulations defining "transaction" that rely
on various indicia of interconnectedness such as time proximity, commonal-
ity of parties, cash flow tracing rules, or something similar. Next assume that
this definition would have caused the "transaction" to include not only the
installation of the solar panels, but also all of the other bits that generated
even larger tax savings. Such a regulation, which defines only a smaller por-
tion of the doctrine and does so in a generally applicable matter, should get
Chevron deference. Under the proposed reading of the relevance provision,
this hypothetical regulation does not unreasonably intrude into the court's
oversight of the ultimate relevance determination because it is only indirectly
outcome determinative.
The same result would apply to other economic substance regulations con-
taining definitions or guidance that similarly indirectly affect outcomes. For
example, regulations could be issued setting parameters for measuring pretax
profit and for determining when such profit would be "substantial" in rela-
tion to the expected tax benefits.306 A handful of additional ambiguous terms
and phrases appear in the codified economic substance doctrine, including
"changes in a meaningful way" and "substantial purpose."3 07 Regulations pro-
viding definitions of or examples illustrating such phrases could be issued that
303Multiple regulations contain facts and circumstances tests, which often list a variety of
factors. See, e.g., Reg. § 1.183-2(b). The hypothetical departs from this general type of test in
including a bright line.
"See supra note 140 (discussing use of solar panel credit hypotheticals).
305Hariton, Frame Game, supra note 2.
3
1I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).
30 7I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 66, No. 3
610
THE RELEVANCE GAMES
would provide substantial guidance to taxpayers and be entitled to Chevron
deference in the judicial system.
V. Conclusion
This Article began with a qualitative review of the congressional materials
generated in the years the economic substance doctrine was being considered
in Congress. The congressional materials suggest approval for a purposive
reading of the tax provisions claimed to produce a transaction's tax benefits
when agencies and courts are determining whether those benefits are pro-
tected from the economic substance doctrine. The congressional materials
reveals trust that the tax agencies will continue to exercise sound judgment
in raising the doctrine on audit and in litigation and trust in the judicial
system's ability to determine the fate of specific tax-avoidance transactions.
Judicial discretion as to the ultimate relevance of the doctrine also implies,
however, narrow limits on the agencies' ability to bind the court's decision
through rulemaking. Judicial oversight over ultimate relevance will undoubt-
edly influence the agencies in their selection of transactions for audit and
litigation. Under the proposed reading of the relevance provision, the rel-
evance games will continue in roughly the same manner as before codifica-
tion-with the economic substance doctrine arena reserved for transactions
meriting the scrutiny.
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